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Willpower Taxes
LiE ANNE FENNELL*
Self-control and related concepts appear regularly in tax discussions, but often they
are invoked hazily or blurred together with other aspects of choice over time. Despite
the evident relevance of willpower to consumption patterns, wealth accumulation,
and, ultimately, well-being, there is no consensus about whether and how heterogene-
ity along this dimehsion should factor into tax policy. There is support in the tax
literature for such divergent responses as funneling more resources to low-willpower
people, penalizing them for their lapses, and limiting their choices. Whether we
should follow one of these approaches, or some other approach entirely, requires a
careful analysis of willpower's workings and its connections to well-being. To begin
such an analysis, I focus on three categories of costs associated with willpower
problems: the failure costs of suboptimal choices, exercise costs stemming from the
willpower exertion itself and erosion costs that relate to changes over time in
willpower levels as a result of patterns of exertions and outcomes. With this frame-
work in mind, I consider the effects of existing and proposed tax policy measures on
people with diferent self-control levels. I then consider how menus of regulatory
bundles that are designed to induce self-sorting could address willpower hetero-
geneity.
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INTRODUCTION
Willpower' matters to well-being. It also implicates activities-saving, spend-
ing, and earning-that fall squarely within the ambit of public finance. Yet there
1. I use the terms "willpower" and "self-control" interchangably here to refer (roughly) to one's







. . . . .
. . . .
WILLPOWER TAxES
is no consensus about how this feature of human behavior should factor into tax
policy. Would an ideal "willpower tax" place a heavier burden on those who
exhibit a greater ability to optimally spread their consumption over time (just as
income taxes place a heavier burden on those who demonstrate a greater ability
to earn money), or would it operate like a sin tax on willpower lapses, placing
additional burdens on those who exhibit low self-control? There is support in
the tax and public finance literature for each of these approaches, as well as for
the simpler expedient of directly limiting choices. In the background is a
growing body of social science research suggesting that willpower exertions are
literally taxing; at least in the short run, these exertions draw down a limited
stock of cognitive resources. 2 Self-control issues present political complexities
as well; more than most behavioral phenomena, willpower lapses touch nerves
and evoke sharply inconsistent normative reactions.
The unresolved question of what to do about willpower surfaces regularly in
key tax policy debates. Assumptions about self-control carry implications for
the choice between consumption and income taxes,3 bear directly on whether
tax liability should be assessed on an annual or lifetime basis,4 and feature
prominently in analyses of public finance mechanisms that carry out intraper-
sonal transfers through the life cycle.5 Further, willpower considerations interact
with philosophical questions relevant to tax policy, such as whether we should
evaluate well-being in terms of entire lives or shorter temporal "slices," 6 or
from an ex ante or ex post perspective.7 Many other high-profile legal and
2. For a recent review of this literature, see Martin S. Hagger et al., Ego Depletion and the Strength
Model of Self-Control: A Meta-Analysis, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 495 (2010). See also infra section I.C.2.
3. For discussion, see the following recent colloquy: Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The
Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1413, 1444-48
(2006) [hereinafter Bankman & Weisbach, Superiority]; Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-Consumption
Tax Consensus, 60 STAN. L. REv. 745, 784-85 (2007); Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, Reply,
Consumption Taxation Is Still Superior to Income Taxation, 60 STAN. L. REv. 789, 800-01 (2007)
[hereinafter Bankman & Weisbach, Consumption].
4. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 3, at 774-76; Jeffrey B. Liebman, Should Taxes Be Based on
Lifetime Income? Vickrey Taxation Revisited 32-37 (Dec. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/jeffreyliebman/vickreydec2003.pdf.
5. Social Security is an important focal point for such analysis. See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, The
Optimal Level of Social Security Benefits, 100 Q.J. EcON. 303 (1985); (agri S. Kumru & Athanasios C.
Thanopoulos, Social Security and Self Control Preferences, 32 J. EcON. DYNAhIcs & CONTROL 757
(2008); Louis Kaplow, Myopia and the Effects of Social Security and Capital Taxation on Labor Supply
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12452, 2006). In addition, progressive taxation
produces intrapersonal as well as interpersonal redistribution-an effect that can be heightened or
dampened through measures like age-based taxation. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, Imperfect Capital
Markets, Intertemporal Redistribution, and Progressive Taxation, in REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH PUBLIc
CHOICE 229, 246-48, 250 (Harold Hochman & George E. Peterson eds., 1974); Lee Anne Fennell &
Kirk J. Stark, Taxation over Time, 59 TAx L. Rev. 1, 46-:51 (2005).
6. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Well-Being, Inequality, and Time: The Time-Slice Problem and Its
Policy Implications (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Scholarship at Penn Law, Paper No. 169, 2007), http://
1sr.nellco.org/upenn-wps/169/.
7. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Chris William Sanchirico, Inequality and Uncertainty: Theory and
Legal Applications,. 155 U. PA. L. REv. 279 (2006) (discussing "the 'ex ante/ex post' problem"); infra
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policy issues raise self-control questions that are (or might be) addressed
through tax and public finance instruments-including choices about welfare
benefits, 8 consumer credit regulation,' and the treatment of "vice" products like
cigarettes"o and fatty foods."
The significance of the topic has not gone unnoticed. In recent years, the tax
and public finance literature has increasingly taken account of complexities of
human behavior, including time-inconsistent preferences and self-control is-
sues. 12 A large body of 'Work has empirically examined and mathematically
modeled many different aspects of the willpower question.13 But the legal
literature lacks a systematic and accessible framework for putting these pieces
together to inform tax policy. This Article makes a start at constructing such a
framework, placing particular emphasis on the issue of willpower heterogeneity.
The analysis here proceeds in four steps. Part I examines why and how
willpower matters to well-being. This inquiry requires delving into how self-
control works, how it is developed, how it is deployed, and how it can become
depleted. It is also necessary to distinguish willpower from a welter of distinct
but often conflated matters such as pure time preferences, risk preferences, and
subjectively preferred but societally disfavored consumption plans. From this
discussion, I distill three categories of costs associated with willpower prob-
lems: failure costs associated with suboptimal choices, exercise costs stemming
from the willpower exertion itself, and erosion costs involving changes over
time in willpower levels that result from patterns of exertions and outcomes.14
section I.B.3. Although Adler and Sanchirico focus primarily on the wedge that uncertainty drives
between the two points of evaluation, ex ante/ex post evaluative questions are raised in the tax realm by
different consumption outcomes, including those generated by savings choices. See Alvin Warren,
Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1097-101 (1980); see
also Bankman & Weisbach, Superiority, supra note 3, at 1441-44; Mark Kelman, Time Preference and
Tax Equity, 35 STAN. L. REv. 649, 654-56 (1983).
8. Consider, for example, the practice of offering welfare applicants a lump-sum "diversion"
payment in exchange for forgoing Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) payments for a
period of time. See, e.g., GRETCHEN RowE, MARY MURPHY, & Ei YIN MON, WELFARE RULEs DATABOOK:
STArE TANF POLICIES AS OF JULY 2009, at 32-35 tbl.I.A.1 (2010), available at http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/412252-Welfare-Rules-Databook.pdf (detailing state diversion programs).
9. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004).
10. See, e.g., Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Studying Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by a
Model of Sin Taxes, 93 AM. EcON. REV. PAPERS AND PRoc. 186 (2003); Jay Bhattacharya & Darius
Lakdawalla, Time-Inconsistency and Welfare (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
10345, 2004).
11. See, e.g., Jeff Strnad, Conceptualizing the "Fat Tax": The Role of Food Taxes in Developed
Economies, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1221 (2005); Sarah McBride, Exiling the Happy Meal, WALL ST. J., July
22, 2008, at Al4 (listing measures and proposals to regulate fatty foods in a number of cities);
Anemona Hartocollis, Failure of State Soda Tax Plan Reflects Power of an Antitax Message, N.Y.
Tims, July 2, 2010, at Al4 (discussing a failed attempt at soda taxation in New York and similar efforts
elsewhere).
12. See, e.g., BEHAvioRAL PUBuc FINANCE (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006); see
also sources cited infra Parts H and III (connecting self-control issues to tax policy questions).
13. For citations and discussion of this literature, see Part 1. For a recent overview, see generally Lee
Anne Fennell, Willpower and Legal Policy, 5 ANN. Rav. L. & Soc. Sci. 91 (2009).
14. See infra section I.C.
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With this framework in mind, I consider how tax policy might best respond to
self-control problems, given heterogeneity in self-control levels. Part H ab-
stracts from real-world difficulties in observing willpower levels to consider
three basic approaches: compensatory payments, penalties for lapses, and restric-
tions on choice. In Part III, I examine how existing and proposed tax policy
choices might (intentionally or not) generate or eliminate advantages or disadvan-
tages for people with different willpower levels. Finally, in Part IV, I consider
mechanisms that could reduce the informational burdens associated with will-
power interventions. Specifically, I investigate whether it might be possible to
induce taxpayers to self-sort into high-willpower and low-willpower groupings
by offering a choice between two regulatory bundles that would be differen-
tially attractive to the two groups.
Before beginning, a caveat is in order. My project here is a limited one.
Willpower is not the only-or even necessarily the most important-cognitive
feature that is relevant to tax policy. Willpower heterogeneity interacts with
many other forms of heterogeneity (in ability, earning patterns, time prefer-
ences, consumption pattern preferences, and so on) in tremendously complex
ways. Self-control problems also interact with-and potentially counteract-a
variety of other cognitive biases and errors.15 I do not attempt to model the
interaction of these factors or to say anything prescriptive about what would be
the best approach for tax policy, all things considered. Instead, I focus on just
one piece of the puzzle and examine how and why it matters. Even within that
narrow compass, my efforts here are necessarily tentative; much depends on
empirical questions that have not yet received definitive answers. Nonetheless,
laying out the relevant considerations and specifying their implications clears a
path for future work.
I. WILLPOWER AND WHY IT MATTERS
A common lament is that people behave myopically-saving too little,
consuming too hastily, indulging in bad habits, and, in general, too heavily
discounting the impact of their present choices on their future selves. 16 But this
pattern is hardly universal. Indeed, some people have the opposite problem,
hyperopia-an overweighting of the future relative to the present that manifests
itself in behaviors like extreme miserliness or workaholism." Although these
15. See, e.g., Gregory Besharov, Second-Best Considerations in Correcting Cognitive Biases, 71 S.
EcoN. J. 12 (2004).
16. See, e.g., David Brooks, The Great Seduction, N.Y. TiMEs, June 10, 2008, at A23 (contending
that it is now "considered normal to play the debt game and imagine that decisions made today will
have no consequences for the future"). For an overview of myopia and discounting, see JONATHAN
BARON, THNKING AND DECIDING 470-80 (3d ed. 2000).
17. See, e.g., Ran Kivetz & Itamar Simonson, Self-Control for the Righteous: Toward a Theory of
Precommitment to Indulgence, 29 J. CoNsumER REs. 199 (2002); George Loewenstein, Anticipation and
the Valuation of Delayed Consumption, 97 EcON. J. 666 (1987); Daniel S. Hamermesh & Joel B.
Slemrod, The Economics of Workaholism: We Should Not Have Worked on This Paper, B.E. J. EcON.
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patterns could be produced by stable preferences (such as for always consuming
earlier rather than later, or vice versa), people often make choices about
consumption that are at odds with what they claim to want for themselves.' 8 We
know that people grapple with intertemporal dilemmas, and that they do so with
varying degrees of self-awareness and success. 9
Because self-control varies among individuals and can have marked effects
on well-being over the life cycle, its relevance for public policy in general and
tax policy in particular is intuitive. Whether we focus on the tax system as a
broad-based mechanism for raising revenue while pursuing a given social
welfare function2 0 or on the capacity of particular tax instruments to selectively
alter incentives,2 1 willpower matters. Pinning down precisely how and why it
matters for tax policy requires understanding both how willpower lapses disrupt
people's ability to translate money into well-being and how taxation choices can
exacerbate or mitigate those effects. To start, we need a working definition of
willpower itself.
A. DEFINING WILLPOWER
Intertemporal decision making is a vast and complex field of study, 2 2 and one
in which terms have not always been used consistently.23 Although definitions
vary, I will use the term "willpower" in this Article to refer to one's personal
efficacy in carrying out the consumption path that one (from a cool, reflective,
ANALYSIS & POL'Y (Jan. 16, 2008), http://www.bepress.com/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1793&
context=bejeap; Lee Anne Fennell, Hyperopia in Public Finance, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE, supra
note 12, at 141.
18. See, e.g., George-Marios Angeletos et al., The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration,
Simulation, and Empirical Evaluation, in TIME AND DECISION: ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES ON INTERTEMPoRAL CHOICE 517, 517-18 (George Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003) (reviewing
evidence on perceived undersaving); B. Douglas Bernheim, Do Households Appreciate Their Financial
Vulnerabilities? An Analysis of Actions, Perceptions, and Public Policy, in TAX POLICY AND EcONOMIC
GROWTH 3, 10-12 (1995) (investigating disparities between "target" and "actual" savings rates based on
survey data and finding that "[t]he median baby boomer believes that it would be appropriate to triple
his or her rate of saving for retirement"); Scott I. Rick et al., Tightwads and Spendthrifts, 34 J.
CONSuMER RES. 767, 770 & tbl.1 (2007) (presenting survey results in which many people self-report
problems with underspending or overspending).
19. See, e.g., Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Self-Awareness and Self-Control, in TIME AND
DECISION, supra note 18, at 217; see also infra text accompanying note 42.
20. The literature on optimal tax theory views the goal of a tax system as minimizing deadweight
loss while raising a specified amount of revenue and fulfilling the distributive objectives associated
with a given social welfare function. See, e.g., William M. Gentry, Optimal Taxation, in THE ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF TAXATION AND TAX POuCY 261 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 1999).
21. See infra section m.C (discussing Pigouvian taxes).
22. For a concise intellectual history of intertemporal choice, see George Loewenstein, The Fall and
Rise of Psychological Explanations in the Economics of Intertemporal Choice, in CHOICE OVER TIA 3
(George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992). Work in this field has proliferated in recent years,
generating numerous competing models for time-related choice. See, e.g., Shane Frederick et al., Time
Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, in TME AND DECISION, supra note 18, at 13.
23. See, e.g., Frederick et al., supra note 22, at 61-62 & fig. 1.4; id. at 73-74 n.42 (listing nineteen
different terms used in discussing choice over time).
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composite, or long-run perspective) 24 deems to be the best of those that lie
open. In other words, willpower operates within the gap between the consump-
tion that one is tempted or habituated to undertake and some self-identified and
otherwise attainable ideal. 2 5 Self-control problems must be carefully distin-
guished both from cognitive errors that keep people from recognizing what is
best for them to do and from preferences, including time-related preferences,
that cause behavior to diverge from what observers might think best. A few
clarifications will help flesh out these distinctions.
First, willpower relates to individuals' subjective optimization efforts and
thus does not depend on societal judgments about the desirability of any
particular consumption plan.2 6 As a corollary of this point, low willpower can
produce not only behavior we might identify as myopic (such as overspending),
but also behavior that is hyperopic (such as oversaving).2 7 Defining willpower
in terms of subjective consumption goals rather than by reference to an objec-
tive benchmark enables us to draw a distinction between lapses of willpower
and mere preferences. An unrepentant spendthrift (or overeater or drug user)28
may exhibit consumption patterns that others would view as improvident, but
unless she herself perceives that another consumption path would be better, her
behavior cannot properly be viewed as a failure of willpower.29
Relatedly, willpower is used here in a manner synonymous with self-
24. A two-self model is frequently used to capture the conflict that calls for the exercise of
willpower. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
25. This notion of a "gap" between preferred and actual consumption appears regularly in the
literature. See, e.g., John Ameriks et al., Measuring Self-Control Problems, 97 Am. EcoN. REv. 966, 967
(2007) (using an "expected-ideal (EI) gap" in people's consumption allocation choices to measure
self-control problems); David I. Laibson, Hyperbolic Discount Functions, Undersaving, and Savings
Policy 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5635, 1996) (identifying a "sophisticated
saver" with a known self-control problem with the following statement: "'Regardless of which tax
regime the government adopts, I expect to experience a large gap between my actual saving level and
my normative saving level."').
26. To be sure, an observer might summarily attribute a lack of willpower to any individual who
fails to achieve the consumption patterns that the observer herself deems normatively desirable. But a
divergence between an observer's preferences and those of a chooser cannot be meaningfully conceptu-
alized as a willpower issue unless dissonance is experienced by the chooser himself.
27. Jon Elster, Introduction, in THE MULTIPLE SELF 1, 6 (Jon Elster ed., 1986) (observing that
"compulsive, rigid, rule-governed behaviour can also be a form of weakness of will") (citing DONALD
DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON AcnONS AND EvENTs 30 (1980)); see also sources cited supra note 17.
28. Even drug addiction can be modeled as the product of rational choice. See Gary S. Becker &
Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, 96 J. POL. EcON. 675 (1988). Of course, scholars
have questioned the extent to which addiction actually fits the rational model. See, e.g., Jonathan
Gruber & Botond Kdszegi, Is Addiction "Rational"? Theory and Evidence, 116 Q.J. EcON. 1261
(2001).
29. However, the preferences that cause an individual to view a plan of extreme consumption as
optimal might be viewed as "expensive tastes" that make a person less well off than she would be if she
did not have them. For discussion of the distributive justice implications of expensive tastes, see Ronald
Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 Pit. & PuB. AFF. 283, 301-04 (1981);
Daniel Markovits, How Much Redistribution Should There Be?, 112 YALE L.J. 2291, 2313-23 (2003). I
thank Noah Zatz for suggesting this connection.
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control; 30 it therefore implies at least the intermittent existence of an internal
would-be "controller" who purports to have superior insight into the best
available consumption plan for the individual.3 1 Thus, willpower problems are
premised on the simultaneous existence of two "selves" who exhibit divergent
preferences.3 2 These two selves have been characterized in various ways but
generally track long-run and short-run perspectives.33 Their willpower-mediated
interactions can produce reversals in preferences over time-that is, time-
inconsistent preferences 34-as one and then the other gains the upper hand.
These time-inconsistent preferences (which are often, but not always, ex-
plained by reference to hyperbolic discounting)35 do not inevitably signify
willpower lapses, but they are often symptomatic of them. To take a standard
example, many people who would prefer $105 in 366 days to $100 in 365 days
would turn down the chance for $105 tomorrow in favor of $100 today--even
though the length of the delay and the difference in the rewards is identical in
30. Usages vary. Compare Hagger et al., supra note 2, at 496 n.1 (listing "willpower" among the
"terms often considered synonymous with self-control"), with Roy F. Baumeister & Kathleen D. Vohs,
Willpower Choice, and Self-Control, in TIME AND DECISION, supra note 18, at 201, 202-04 (using
"willpower" to refer to a particular theory of self-control).
31. See, e.g., Elster, supra note 27, at 6 (explaining that "weakness of will" is a concept that
"requires both that there is a conflict between two opposed wishes, and that the wish that the person
himself judges to be the more decisive loses out"); George Loewenstein, Willpower: A Decision-
Theorist's Perspective, 19 L. & PmL. 51, 52 (2000) ("The concept of willpower suggests that there is
some part of the self that needs to be controlled to do what another part of the self wants.").
32. Richard H. Thaler & H.M. Shefrin, An Economic Theory of Self-Control, 89 J. POL. EcoN. 392,
393-94 (1981) (quoting DONALD MCBNSH, THE FouNDATrIONS OF HUMAN SocITaY (1969) (observing that
the notion of self-control would be "paradoxical" without the concept of two selves)).
33. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Are We One Self or Multiple Selves? Implications for Law and
Public Policy, 3 LEGAL THEORY 23, 25 (1997) (discussing conflicts between the "future-oriented" or
"adult" self and the "present-oriented" or "child" self); Thaler & Shefrin, supra note 32, at 394
(characterizing the two selves as a "planner" and a "doer"); see also Drew Fudenberg & David K.
Levine, A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control, 96 AM. EcoN. REv. 1449 (2006) (discussing past
two-self models and presenting one in which a long-run self interacts with a series of short-run selves);
Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. EcON. REV. 103, 113 (1999)
(modeling a "long-run perspective" in which each period is weighted equally). A related idea is that of
"hot states" and "cold states"; one might view the former as instances in which the long-range or
"planner" self is given little deference. See George Loewenstein, Emotions in Economic Theory and
Economic Behavior, 90 AM. EcON. REv. (PAPERS & PRoc.) 426, 428-29 (2000) (discussing the "hot/cold
empathy gap" as an inability to predict this shift in internal control). For a recent summary of dual-self
models, see Gharad Bryan et al., Commitment Devices, 2 ANN. REv. EcON. 671, 678 (2010).
34. Economic work on time inconsistency traces back to R.H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in
Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REy. EcoN. STUD. 165 (1955). For a helpful review of work on
time-discounting and time-inconsistent preferences, see Frederick et al., supra note 22.
35. On hyperbolic discounting, see, for example, GEORGE AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF WILL 30-32 &
fig.2B (2001) (describing and depicting hyperbolic discounting); David Laibson, Golden Eggs and
Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. EcoN. 443, 446-51 (1997) (modeling preference reversals using a
quasi-hyperbolic discount function). For alternative explanations of preference reversals, see, for
example, Daniel Read, Is Time-Discounting Hyperbolic or Subadditive?, 23 J. RISK & UNcERTAINTY 5
(2001), and Ariel Rubinstein, "Economics and Psychology"? The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting, 44
INT'L EcoN. REv. 1207 (2003).
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the two cases.3 Such preference reversals may occur if the internal controller
who initially selected the larger, later reward lacks the power to stop immediate
consumption when it becomes available. However, if someone naively switches
preferences as a choice approaches and neither foresees that this will occur nor
understands that it undermines her own long-run plans, the problem does not,
strictly speaking, implicate willpower. Similarly, forms of myopia or hyperopia
that merely alter the perceived size of future rewards without producing any
awareness of the distortion would not represent willpower shortfalls. 37
Finally, low willpower is distinct from, although entangled with, other cogni-
tive and computational limits.3 8 Such limits, along with imperfect information
and uncertainty about the future, may cause people to guess wrong about the
best available pattern of consumption and aim their willpower efforts at the
wrong target. Willpower lapses might in some cases fortuitously offset these
mispredictions, as where a person erroneously believes she should save more
than is really optimal. In other cases, errors might help reduce willpower
lapses, as where people inflate the harm of an action like smoking.40 More
worrisome is the possibility that a misprediction will magnify a willpower
lapse, as where a worker wrongly assumes she will have an upward-trending
income profile and yet succumbs to spending that is excessive even by her own
calculations. Significantly, however, the increment of harm caused by the
miscalculation cannot be attributed to low willpower.4 1
One of the areas in which people may miscalculate, of course, is in gauging
their own future susceptibility to self-control problems. A person who does not
recognize in advance the existence or extent of her willpower vulnerabilities can
36. See, e.g., Frederick et al., supra note 22, at 25; O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 33, at 103
(discussing "present-biased preferences").
37. See Elster, supra note 27, at 15-16 (observing that "myopia need not be a case of weakness of
the will" and citing instances in which people have consistently short-sighted preferences and do not
perceive any intertemporal dilemma). Nonetheless, "myopia" and "hyperopia" are commonly used to
indicate self-acknowledged deviations from a better available consumption path.
38. See B. Douglas Bernheim, Taxing and Saving 36 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 7061, 1999) (distinguishing self-control issues from those involving bounded rationality and
explaining that the latter "arise from the complexity of intertemporal planning"). However, the two do
interact. See id. at 38 (noting that self-control models involve complex interactions among current and
future selves that "accentuate the problems associated with cognitive limitations").
39. See, e.g., Besharov, supra note 15, at 12-13 (citing Matthew Rabin, Comment, in BEHAvIORAL
DIAENSIONS OF RETIREMENT EcONOMIcs 247 (Henry J. Aaron ed., 1999)); see also Douglas Glen
Whitmran & Mario J. Rizzo, Paternalist Slopes, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 411, 427-28 (2007) (citing
Besharov and discussing the potential for offsetting biases).
40. Indeed, people may choose to remain "strategically ignorant" about actual risks if their inflated
beliefs help to fortify their own willpower resolve. See Juan D. Carrillo & Thomas Mariotti, Strategic
Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device, 67 REv. EcON. STuD. 529 (2000).
41. Disaggregating the harms caused by willpower lapses and other errors will not always be so
easy, however. Suppose, for example, that someone erroneously subscribes to an overly austere budget
and then suffers a willpower lapse that raises her spending far above her (actual) optimal target. Here,
we cannot rule out the possibility that the predictive error may have triggered the lapse and that the
individual would have been able to comply with an optimally-set target.
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still suffer from low willpower.42 All that is necessary is that the person have in
mind a (subjectively) superior choice before failing to opt for it. Although a
miscalculation about willpower is not itself a failure of willpower, it can
undermine remedial efforts. For example, a person who does not recognize her
own future willpower vulnerabilities may fail to precommit when doing so
would be in her best interest.43 This predictive error about willpower may,
however, offset other kinds of predictive errors. Someone who fails to precom-
mit because she overestimates her future resolve may end up gaining as a result
if the course to which she would have precommitted turns out to be a mistake."
Defining willpower in the way I have here makes failures of willpower
deeply subjective, internal phenomena.45 This understanding fits well with how
most people understand the term, but it also raises issues for public policy.
Because willpower lapses are observationally equivalent to intertemporal choices
that are produced by preferences or errors, willpower can only be treated as a
distinct phenomenon if it is possible to develop workable proxies, information-
forcing mechanisms, or other tools to improve or substitute for direct observa-
tion. Even more fundamentally, however, we need to pinpoint the kinds of
harms willpower problems cause before we can determine the policy relevance
of willpower heterogeneity. The next sections explore that question.
B. SELF-CONTROL AND CONSUMPTION CHOICES OVER TIME
To understand the significance of willpower for well-being, it is necessary to
step back and consider consumption over time more generally.
1. The Life-Cycle Model
The dominant economic models for understanding consumption decisions
over time are the permanent income hypothesis and the related life-cycle model
(which, although they differ in some particulars, I will here refer to collectively
as the "life-cycle hypothesis").4 On this account, an individual's consumption
42. See, e.g., O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 33, at 104 (distinguishing those who are naive about
their self-control problems from those who are sophisticated and recognize the problem in advance);
O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 19, at 219-20 (considering a spectrum of self-awareness that
includes partial as well as full naivet6 about self-control problems).
43. See infra section IV.A (discussing this issue and noting some ways that the self-selection
problem might be addressed).
44. In such a case, observers may be unable to tell whether a changed course of action is a rational
response to new information or an unforeseen lapse of willpower. See infra note 246.
45. This is not to say that the exercise of willpower might not be observable to some extent through
neuroscience, only that it cannot be reliably inferred from behavioral outcomes. See infra note 93; cf
B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare
Economics, in THE FouNDAfloNs OF PosMVE AND NORMATIVE EcoNoMIcs: A HANDBOOK 155, 189 (Andrew
Caplin & Andrew Schotter eds., 2008) (noting the authors' divergent views about the likely future role
of neuroscience in "officiating between conflicting choices").
46. See MELTON FRIEDMAN, A THEORY OF THE CONSUMVON FUNCrION 25-31 (1957) (presenting the
permanent income hypothesis); Franco Modigliani & Richard Brumberg, Utility Analysis and the
Consumption Function: An Interpretation of Cross-Section Data, in PosT-KEYNESIAN EcoNoMIcs 388
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in a given period is not tied to that period's income alone, but rather represents
an optimal consumption level given the person's lifetime earnings.47 Whether
income arrives steadily or irregularly, people calibrate their consumption in the
same way-or so the story goes. This activity is referred to as "consumption
smoothing" based on the commonplace assumption that optimal consumption is
likely to be significantly smoother than earning patterns. If people experience
diminishing marginal returns to consumption within each period and the height
and shape of the marginal utility curve remains unchanged over the life cycle,
people will do best by spreading out their consumption rather than letting it
track income or intentionally piling it into large heaps.48 Of course, marginal
returns to consumption are likely to be higher in some periods than others, so
that perfect smoothing will not be optimal.49 For example, if we examine
matters at the household level, we would need to take into account periods in
which dependent children are present.50 It is also possible that certain large
lumps of consumption will be so highly valued by some individuals that the
opposite of consumption smoothing-consumption lumping-would be opti-
mal.51
Despite these complications and the concomitant difficulty in discerning
whether any particular real-world consumption pattern is optimal,52 research
suggests that actual consumption is more sensitive to the timing of income
streams than would be predicted by the life-cycle model. 5 3 Although willpower
shortfalls doubtless play a role, there are many other reasons why this might be
the case. First, imperfect capital markets present liquidity constraints; thus,
people are not always able to move money earlier in time.5 4 Similarly, incom-
plete insurance markets may force people to push more money into the future as
(Kenneth K. Kurihara ed., 1955) (presenting the life-cycle model); see also ALAN E.H. SPEIGHT,
CONSuMPTiON, RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND LIQuIDTrrY THEORY AND EVIDENCE 52-53 (1989) (discussing
these models and some differences between them).
47. See, e.g., ANGUs DEATON, UNDERSTANDING CONSUMPTION 26 (1992) (according to the life-cycle
hypothesis, "consumption patterns are shaped by tastes and life-cycle needs, and not by the temporal
pattern of life-cycle labor income"); Modigliani & Brumberg, supra note 46, at 392 ("The rate of
consumption in any given period is a facet of a plan which extends over the balance of the individual's
life, while the income accruing within the same period is but one element which contributes to the
shaping of such a plan.").
48. See, e.g., Fennell & Stark, supra note 5, at 8 & n.26.
49. See, e.g., DEMoN, supra note 47, at 5, 26.
50. See id. at 5 (suggesting that because marginal utility of consumption is higher for a household
that includes more people, "the life-cycle pattern of household consumption can be expected to have
the same general shape as the life-cycle pattern of household size").
51. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 3, at 766.
52. See, e.g., Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Eco-
nomic Theory, 58 U. Cm. L. REV. 1275, 1310-11 ("Any argument that a given savings level is or is not
optimal must ultimately appeal to intuitions, such as that about the low likelihood that steeply declining
lifetime consumption maximizes utility.").
53. See, e.g., DEATON, supra note 47, at 87-103; Angeletos et al., supra note 18, at 534-36; Fennell
& Stark, supra note 5, at 16-20.
54. See, e.g., DEATN, supra note 47, at 162-63; Polinsky, supra note 5, at 233-35.
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a precaution than they would if all uncertainty could be adequately hedged.
Conversely, risk and uncertainty might at times push people toward consuming
earlier than they would otherwise prefer. For example, one reason for consum-
ing now rather than later is that one cannot be sure one will be alive later to
56
engage in consumption.
Even within the realm of cognition, more is going on than willpower. Hersh
Shefrin and Richard Thaler's "behavioral life-cycle hypothesis," which incorpo-
rates widely observed cognitive phenomena not accounted for in the standard
life-cycle model, takes into account not only time-inconsistent preferences but
also features like optimism and mental accounting that may drive a wedge
between optimal and actual consumption.5 7 Some divergences from the life-
cycle model's predictions stem from computational limits; faced with the
enormous complexity of arranging one's lifetime consumption, people often
resort to simple heuristics or rules of thumb. Uncertainty can also interact
with cognitive biases to produce choices that deviate from the predictions of the
life-cycle model. People may mispredict how their marginal utility of consump-
tion will change in the future-or how it might do so contingent on uncertain
55. See, e.g., KENNETHm J. ARRow, Insurance, Risk and Resource Allocation, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY
OF RISK-BEARING 134, 134-43 (1971) (discussing the limitations of insurance and other risk-shifting
institutions); DEATON, supra note 47, at 34-37, 197; Christopher D. Carroll, Buffer-Stock Saving and the
Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis, 112 Q.J. EcoN. 1, 4 (1997) (discussing implications of a
"buffer-stock model ... in which the principal purpose of holding wealth is so that it can be used to
absorb random shocks to income"); Shaviro, supra note 3, at 772-73. Borrowing constraints interact
with risk. See DEATON, supra note 47, at 197 (describing "[t]he ability to borrow in bad times" as "an
insurance device for at least some consumers, and if this mechanism is closed off, additional provision
must be made for such eventualities"). More generally, the distributive work of taxation is only
necessary because of incomplete insurance markets (here, for ability). Shaviro, supra note 3, at 757
(citing DANIEL SHAVIRO, MAKING SENSE OF SOCIAL SECuRITY REFORM 52 (2000)); see Dworkin, supra note
29, at 314-23 (examining the implications of hypothetical insurance markets for skill); David A.
Weisbach, Toward a New Approach to Disability Law, 2009 U Cm. LEGAL F. 47, 74 ("Designing a tax
system .. .is very much like designing an optimal insurance policy." (footnote omitted)).
56. See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 7, at 660-69. Similarly, choosers who are uncertain about whether
the person or entity offering them an intertemporal choice will really follow through on the delayed
alternative as promised may find it safer to take a smaller reward immediately, even if they would
prefer the larger, later reward. This seems to be the best explanation of the purported "puzzle" of people
failing to buy energy efficient appliances whose higher initial cost would be more than repaid by
cheaper operating costs. See George Loewenstein & Draien Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal
Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation, in CHOICE OVER TrME, supra note 22, at 119, 137-38 (citing
studies inferring high discount rates based on choices about consumer durables). Well-acquainted with
puffery and claims that turn out not to match up with their own experiences, consumers may find it
safer to take the savings up front rather than count on them to materialize later. See, e.g., Bankman &
Weisbach, Superiority, supra note 3, at 1446 (suggesting that studies like those on energy efficient
appliances often "involve choices in which the discount rate may be confounded by a lack of
information").
57. Hersh M. Shefrin & Richard H. Thaler, The Behavioral Life-Cycle Hypothesis, 26 EcoN. INQUIRY
609 (1988).
58. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 1051, 1075-81 (2000) (citing and
discussing literature on this point).
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events, like changes in health status or the death of family members.5 9 For
example, a young person who puts off expensive travel may be operating on the
assumption that she will get the same amount of pleasure from traveling in her
later years; if this turns out to be untrue, the delay will have made her worse
off.60 Significantly, this is not a question of willpower, even though the pattern
may look hyperopic. Rather, it stems from the individual's inability to deter-
mine her optimal consumption plan under external constraints.
As the foregoing example suggests, the notion of a consumption plan that
would maximize an individual's lifetime well-being within the bounds of
external limits lurks in the background of willpower discussions. Explicitly
developing this idea of an "optimal available consumption plan" (OACP) offers
a useful starting point for thinking precisely about what willpower lapses cost.
2. Anatomy of an OACP
Willpower has the intriguing property of mediating between a person's own
best laid plans and her ability to advance them. But sometimes those best laid
plans do not, in fact, represent a path to higher lifetime well-being. If our
interest is in the effect of willpower heterogeneity on well-being, we will want
to know how much willpower lapses cost individuals in lost utility over the life
cycle. This requires filtering out the costs that come from aiming at the wrong
target and netting out the gains that come from failing, through lack of will-
power, to advance wrong-headed goals. In other words, willpower lapses pro-
duce disutility only to the extent that they interfere with an individual's pursuit
of her OACP. An individual's OACP can be roughly defined as the most
preferred consumption plan that is available to her, given external constraints
(such as budget and liquidity constraints and limits on risk reallocation).
Individuals are also subject to the prevailing legal regime, which may withdraw
certain desired choices and influence others through taxes, subsidies, or other
mechanisms. 61 Both the individual's OACP and the individual's actual consump-
tion pattern must fit within these constraints.
The question of willpower enters into the picture only within the range of
freedom that these external constraints leave open. The more limited that
59. See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 7, at 669-70. Research supports a "projection bias" that limits
people's ability to know how they will feel under different conditions, including quite common states
such as hunger. George Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q. J. EcON.
1209 (2003); see also Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, 35 ADvANcEs iN
ExPERMEN TAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 345 (2003).
60. See Kelman, supra note 7, at 670 (using travel examples to illustrate how interest payments may
or may not make up for the diminished enjoyment that may be associated with delayed consumption).
61. See Laibson, supra note 25, at 2 (distinguishing a person who cannot achieve optimal savings
due to self-control problems from someone who rationally chooses the savings level that is optimal in
light of a given inefficient tax environment).
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compass, the less heterogeneity in willpower will matter.62 At the extreme,
imagine a person who has no ability to borrow money and earns only enough
each day to keep body and soul together. Such a person's actual consumption
pattern will hew closely to her OACP regardless of her willpower level, because
external constraints produce an OACP that is so tightly fitted to her survival
needs that no other plausible pathway beckons. Likewise, loosening borrowing
constraints will have different impacts on different individuals, depending on
their willpower levels. For some, it removes a binding constraint and makes
possible a better approximation of the optimal lifetime-consumption plan; for
others, it merely facilitates a wider divergence from that plan.M Similarly,
people with front-loaded life-cycle earnings (such as child actors or professional
athletes), have more to lose from willpower lapses than those who receive
money later in time, holding all else equal.
A remaining question is what the term "optimal" means in the context of an
OACP. To say that an optimal plan is one that is best by the individual's own
lights gains us little ground if the individual has time-inconsistent preferences.
We must make some judgment about which of the "selves" is to be viewed as
authoritative on the question. 6 6 When short-run impulses threaten to derail long
range planning, it might seem reasonable to grant priority to the long-run self.67
But the fact that people make mistakes not only in the direction of overconsump-
tion but also in the direction of underconsumption may cast doubt on the
planner's authority. What is needed is a way to meaningfully aggregate the
interests of the selves. Conceptualizing the OACP as the outcome of a hypotheti-
62. Thus, as we will see, one response to willpower heterogeneity might be to toughen external
constraints, as through legal restrictions that remove certain consumption options. See infra sections
II.C and l1.D.
63. See, e.g., M. Keith Chen & Alan Schwartz, Intertemporal Choice and Legal Constraints, 13 AM.
L. & EcON. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 11, 31) (April 2011 draft on file with author).
64. See Laibson, supra note 35, at 465-67 (explaining how increased liquidity could actually be
welfare reducing for consumers who would like to use illiquid assets, such as their homes, as
commitment devices).
65. See Thaler & Shefrin, supra note 32, at 401 (observing that athletes' "declining income stream
creates a difficult self-control problem in the high-income years").
66. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, HARM To SELF, 3 THE MORAL LIMIrrS OF THE CRIMINAL LAw 83 (1986)
(noting difficulty in determining which self's preferences should have priority when both "appear td be
equally voluntary"); GLEN WHITMAN, CATo INsTTrTTE, AGAINST THE NEW PATERNALISM: INTERNALIEs AND
THE EcoNoMIcs OF SELF-CONTROL 1 (2006), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa563.pdf (contending that
"internality theory in its current form unjustifiably 'takes sides' when it chooses to favor some personal
interests over others"); Chrisoula Andreou, Making a Clean Break: Addiction and Ulysses Contracts,
22 BIoETEcs 25, 29-30 (2008) (analogizing granting priority to the choice preferred by most of the
temporal selves to "mob rule"); Eric Rasmusen, Internalities and Paternalism: Applying the Compensa-
tion Criterion to Multiple Selves Across Time 15 (Oct. 6, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.rasmusen.org/papers/internality-rasmusen.pdf (observing that "what is special about Self 0
is that he is making a choice about something before it becomes a present decision"-a fact that
generates an "uncomfortable" justification for privileging a prior precommitting self).
67. Much work on time-inconsistent preferences adopts this perspective, whether explicitly or




cal bargaining session among an assembly of all temporal selves is one possibil-
ity.6 8 We might say, for example, that one OACP trumps another if the selves
who get their way under it win enough to compensate the selves who lose out.6 9
The notion of an intraself bargaining session is admittedly artificial, and there
are both practical and conceptual impediments to taking it literally.70 Nonethe-
less, viewed as a thought experiment, it can help to illuminate the lifetime
welfare-maximizing baseline that the OACP represents, against which we can
assess the well-being costs of willpower failures.
It might seem more straightforward to use objective measures of well-being
to assess the costs of willpower lapses. Yet presumably our reason for caring
about willpower lapses as such (rather than merely as a subset of poor decisions
that we might wish to regulate for other reasons) derives from the capacity of
those lapses to undermine a person's own plans. Although an OACP is a
construct that real-world individuals do not and could not have full access to,
willpower is only interesting to the extent that people can at least roughly
68. If the selves could make the appropriate deals and side payments, the results would be Pareto
efficient, leaving no selves worse off and at least one self better off. See, e.g., O'Donoghue & Rabin,
supra note 33, at 112-13 (discussing and critiquing the use of intraself Pareto efficiency to assess
welfare); Bhattacharya & Lakdawalla, supra note 10, at 1-2 (describing conditions for a "Pareto
self-improving policy"). See also WHTmrAN, supra note 66 (applying Coasean analysis to internal
bargaining).
69. This would amount to the application of the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion to the intraper-
sonal realm. See Rasmusen, supra note 66, at 15-21 (developing and applying an "intraself Kaldor-
Hicks criterion"); see also O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 33, at 113 (constructing a "long-run
perspective" based on "a (fictitious) period 0 where the person has no decision to make and weights all
future periods equally").
70. A key conceptual difficulty with the hypothetical intraself bargaining model involves the
question of what resources each "self" is assumed to enter the negotiation room holding, given the
sequential manner in which resource-acquisition and resource-depletion decisions are actually made. In
what currency can a later self promise to pay off an earlier self who threatens to engage in a binge of
consumption that will leave the later self without funds? Likewise, if one self is deemed to start with all
the resources, no Pareto-improving moves are possible, although the results would not maximize
well-being over the life cycle. The selves might instead devote their bargaining session to developing
an intrapersonal social welfare function for aggregating their interests. I thank Chris Sanchirico and
Matthew Adler for discussions on these points.
More fundamentally, all of the selves cannot, in fact, get together to bargain because they are not all
in existence at the same time. Instead, a rather different bargaining process (even if largely implicit) is
likely to occur between an individual's present-focused self and her long-run (forward-looking) self
who acts as a representative for all her future selves based on currently available information. See, e.g.,
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 94 (1984) (positing that absent future selves might
have an "attorney" present); Lawrence Zelenak, Tax Policy and Personal Identity over Time, 62 TAX L.
REv. 333, 368 n.164 (2009) (raising the possibility that a "planner" self might be "understood as a
fiduciary for a future self (or selves)"); see also George Ainslie, Procrastination: The Basic Impulse, in
THE THIEF OF TuI: PHLOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON PROCRASTINAION 11, 20 (Chrisoula Andreou & Mark D.
White eds., 2010) ("A long-range interest (principal) can be regarded as supervising successive
motivational states of the person (agents) by means of personal rules."); Elster, supra note 27, at 14-15
(distinguishing a concurrent divided self from a series of temporally sequential selves). This bargaining
process can fail to result in OACP-compatible decisions for reasons owing to mistakes and missing
information as well as to failures of will. See supra section I.A.
71. For a defense of an objective theory of well-being, see Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectiv-
ity of Well-Being and the Objectives of Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669 (2003).
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identify the path that is best for them. If people are utterly misguided about
what is best for them, then we are dealing not with a problem of self-control but
rather with an entirely different set of issues that willpower-related policies
cannot address.
3. Willpower Heterogeneity and Lifetime Well-Being
The life-cycle hypothesis makes strong implicit assumptions about the degree
of cooperation and resource sharing that occurs among a person's various
temporal selves.7 2 These assumptions break down for many reasons, as we have
seen. In comparing the well-being of two people over their lifetimes," we must
examine not only their lifetime earnings but also how well they can leverage
those earnings into utility. This depends in part on their ability to arrange
consumption optimally within the .life cycle,74 which, among other things,
depends on willpower.
It is well understood that people with identical lifetime earnings but different
earning patterns may have different consumption patterns and hence different
72. See Zelenak, supra note 70, at 348-51 (noting and critiquing assumptions underlying a lifetime
approach to taxation). The resource-sharing issue is one part of a larger philosophical inquiry into the
degree to which an individual remains relevantly "the same person" over the course of a lifetime. See,
e.g., DEREK PARFrr, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984); Shane Frederick, Time Preference and Personal
Identity, in TIME AND DECISION, supra note 18, at 89; David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics,
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edulentries/identity-ethics (last revised Mar. 5,
2008). For a discussion of the implications of identity over time for tax policy, see generally Zelenak,
supra note 70. See also Adler, supra note 6, at 50-53 (describing and endorsing a lifetime methodology
for tax modeling).
73. There is an antecedent question of whether the lifetime is the right unit of analysis for evaluating
and comparing well-being. See MxrrHEw D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DisTauroN: BEYOND
CosT-BENEFrT ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at ch. 6) (on. file with author); Adler, supra
note 6; see also PARFrr, supra note 72, at 343-44 (quoting and discussing THOMAs NAGEL, MORIAL
QUESTIONs 124-25 & n.16 (1979) (examining the significance for distributive justice of personal
identity over time)); Zelenak, supra note 70, at 342-33 (discussing Parfit's view of how matters of
identity affect the analysis of distributive questions).
74. Here it becomes relevant that well-being in different periods is not additively separable, meaning
that we cannot simply add up each year's utility in isolation and examine the total. See DEATON, supra
note 47, at 15-17 (discussing the assumption of additive separability that is sometimes used in formal
treatments and its shortcomings, as well as some ways that economists have built nonadditivity into
models); Adler, supra note 6, at 13-14. Preferences for improvement over time and adaptive effects
make utility sequences and patterns highly relevant to lifetime utility. See, e.g., DEAMN, supra note 47,
at 16 (explaining that "[aidditivity rules out phenomena such as habit formation"); Adler, supra note 6,
at 13 (observing that, among other. things, "[aidditive separability rules out the possibility .. . of an
improvement effect-namely that a life where facts with respect to some aspect of well-being get better
over time is better just by virtue of this improvement"). A large body of empirical work establishes that
improving sequences are generally preferred over flat or declining ones. See, e.g., Dan Ariely & Ziv
Carmon, Summary Assessment of Experiences: The Whole Is Different from the Sum of Its Parts, in
TIME AND DECISION, supra note 18, at 323, 327 (observing that "one of the most robust findings in
research about assessment of experiences is the clear preference for improvement over time" and
collecting citations to studies establishing this preference); Frederick et al., supra note 22, at 28-29
(reviewing literature); George Loewenstein & Draien Prelec, Preferences for Sequences of Outcomes,
100 PSYCHOL. REv. 91 (1993).
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lifetime utility levels. What this paper hopes to emphasize is the following
additional point: two people with identical lifetime earnings and identical
earning patterns. (as well as identical external constraints on borrowing and
insuring,76 and identical computational and predictive capacities) could nonethe-
less experience very different levels of lifetime well-being owing to willpower-
related differences in their ability to allocate consumption within the life cycle.
It is these differences that I will explore here.
C. THE COSTS OF WILLPOWER LAPSES
Willpower lapses carry obvious costs when they cause people's consumption
patterns to diverge from their OACPs. But we must also take into account the
costs incurred (whether successfully or not) to prevent failures of will from
happening. Some recent scholarship helpfully explores the problem in terms
of intrapersonal transaction costs that prevent temporal selves from friction-
lessly working out their differences. As in the interpersonal case, intrapersonal
transaction costs generate two potential problems. First is a concern that the
conflict will never reach an efficient resolution-the higher valuing user will not
get the entitlement. Just as a factory might be forced to shut down when it
would be efficient for it to continue operating or allowed to continue when it
would be efficient for it to shut down, an individual might, for example, smoke
when it is not efficient for her to do so (in terms of fulfilling her own lifetime
preferences), or she might fail to smoke when it would be efficient for her to do
so (if the pleasure from smoking actually outweighs the long-term risks).80
A second concern relates to the resources that are wasted in the course of
transacting.8 Just as wrangling among neighbors over a factory's operation
consumes resources, so too does wrangling among selves. Even if the entitle-
75. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 6, at 52. The point is easiest to see if we imagine that income tends to
be temporally "sticky," in the sense that it is consumed within (or relatively near) the period in which it
is earned rather than being equally available throughout the life cycle.
76. I refer here to initial limits on borrowing and insuring given income and earning patterns.
Low-willpower people might experience a constriction (or, in some contexts, an expansion) of credit
based on their observed patterns of spending and repaying. Similarly, insurance costs might go up if, for
example, lack of willpower translates into impulsive risk-seeking behavior that insurers can observe.
77. Cf GuIDo CALABREsi, THE CosTS OF AccIDENrs: A LEGAL AND EcoNoMic ANALYsis (1970).
Calabresi emphasized that the costs of accident prevention and administrative costs, as well as the
harms caused by the accidents themselves, must be taken into account. Id. at 26-31. I will not address
administrative costs explicitly here, but the policy alternatives discussed in Parts IfI and IV, as well as
private or self-administered approaches to willpower, should be assessed in light of this consideration.
78. See, e.g., WHrrMAN, supra note 66, at 8-10 (discussing the potential for, and impediments to,
bargaining between present and future selves); see also AINSLIE, supra note 35, at 105-16 (discussing
intrapersonal bargaining); Rasmusen, supra note 66 (analyzing potential intraself bargains).
79. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melaned, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1119 (1972).
80. See WHTrMAN, supra note 66, at 6 (developing this analogy).
81. See, e.g., RIcHARD A. EPsTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ToRrs 706-07 (9th ed. 2008) (discussing,
in the context of injunctive relief, both the risk of failing to reach an agreement and the waste of
resources associated with the bargaining process itself).
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ment does ultimately reach the higher valuing user, resources will be dissipated
in the transfer process.8 2 These two categories of costs, which I will call "failure
costs" and "exercise costs," respectively, are examined in the following sections-
along with a third category, "erosion costs," which relates to the effects over
time of patterns of willpower exertions and failures.8 3
1. Failure Costs
Willpower failures are both ubiquitous and varied. In some cases, these
.failures may impose no costs, or may actually confer benefits, if other errors
have caused people to aim their willpower efforts at the wrong target.8 In
general, however, we think that willpower lapses move people away from their
OACPs, typically by causing them to consume earlier than they-in their
composite deliberative states-would prefer. People who are aware of their own
propensity to consume too early may adopt personal financial rules or other
precommitment mechanisms. These approaches may enable them to attain
better results than through unstructured consumption but may still fall short of
the optimal plan (whether by undershooting, overshooting, or doing some of
both).86 For these reasons and others, people may actually consume later than
they would prefer or ultimately consume less on a lifetime basis than they
would prefer."8
Other willpower shortfalls involve choices among goods or activities. For
example, willpower is often exerted in certain domains (such as food, tobacco,
alcohol, and exercise) not simply to rearrange a fixed quantum of consumption
within the life cycle but rather to change the total amounts and mixes of the
goods that are consumed. Thus, willpower failures may cause people to con-
sume things they would prefer not to consume at all (such as cigarettes or
mindless television shows), or fail to consume at all things that they would like
82. See id.
83. I introduced this taxonomy in prior work. See Fennell, supra note 13, at 99-101. Although I have
not seen this precise breakdown elsewhere, the underlying ideas are not new; all three types of costs are
well-recognized in the literature. See infra sections I.C.1, I.C.2 & I.C.3 (citing and discussing
scholarship addressing each of these three types of costs).
84. This is one of several ways in which cognitive errors might offset each other. See generally
Besharov, supra note 15 (describing interactions among cognitive biases and their effects on attempts at
correction). In other instances, willpower lapses may confer social benefits, as where a would-be
criminal procrastinates in undertaking steps towards committing an offense. See Manuel A. Utset,
Procrastination and the Law, in THE THIEF OF TIE: PHMLOsOPHIcAL ESSAYS ON PROCRASTINATION, supra
note 70, at 253, 263-65 (discussing "time-inconsistent obedience" in the context of crime commission).
85. For analysis of the role potentially played by personal rules, see, for example, GEORGE AINSLIE,
PICOECONOMICS: THE STRATEGic INTERACTION OF SucCESSIVE MOTIVATIONAL STAms WrfuN THE PERSON
142-73 (1992); Roland B6nabou & Jean Tirole, Willpower and Personal Rules, 112 J. POL. EcON. 848
(2004); Thaler & Shefrin, supra note 32, at 397-98.
86. See, e.g., AINsuE, supra note 35, at 143-60 (examining implications of breaking and following
personal rules); B6nabou & Tirole, supra note 85, at 850 (explaining that personal rules create risks of
both underregulation and overregulation).
87. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADoxES AND ANOMALIES OF EcONOMIC LIFE
118 (1992) (noting lower-than-expected rates of dissaving among the elderly).
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to consume (such as a vacation to Alaska or a college education). People may
also, over a lifetime or some subset of it, consume more or less of certain things
(such as certain kinds of books or particular types of foods) than they would
prefer.8 8
Failure costs can also expand beyond the direct personal fallout of a given
laspe. For one thing, willpower failures may have implications for the individu-
al's ability to resist future temptations, as will be discussed below.89 But the
costs of willpower failures may also extend beyond the individual by affecting
other people. This could occur through any number of channels. Some activi-
ties, like smoking, have direct spillovers on others (secondhand smoke). Other
activities may affect other individuals through avenues like health insurance
premiums, depending on the pooling and pricing rules in place.90 Another
intriguing possibility raised by recent empirical work is that certain effects, such
as obesity, could spread through social networks. 91 While externalities can form
an entirely separate justification for regulating conduct, 9 2 willpower lapses can
contribute to the problem of external costs by causing people to make decisions
that are not even personally optimal.
2. Exercise Costs
Although much remains to be learned about the operation of willpower, a
large and growing body of empirical research finds that it costs something in
cognitive terms to exercise self-control.94 In one study, for example, hungry
participants who had to resist a plate of freshly baked chocolate chip cookies
88. Consumption choices can dramatically affect the lifetime budget line, as where choices are made
early in life between working and loafing or between spending and saving. Thus, divergences from an
initial OACP that are produced by willpower lapses may produce a more constrained OACP over time.
Conversely, willpower skills developed early in life that alter consumption choices at young ages can
expand the OACP over time. This point relates to larger questions about early and late investments in
skill formation. See generally Flavio Cunha & James J. Heckman, Investing in Our Young People (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.16201, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
wl6201.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 100-09 (discussing the impact of past willpower failures on
the likelihood of future failures).
90. See, e.g., Jay Bhattacharya & Neeraj Sood, Health Insurance and the Obesity Externality, in 17
THE EcoNoMucs OF OBEsrrY. ADvAMCEs IN HEALTH ECONOMICS AND HEALTH SERVICEs RESEARCH 279
(Kristian Bolin & John Cawley eds., 2007).
91. See Nicholas A. Christakis & James H. Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social Network
over 32 Years, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED. 370 (2007). But see Ethan Cohen-Cole & Jason M. Fletcher, Is
Obesity Contagious? Social Networks v. Environmental Factors in the Obesity Epidemic, 27 J. HEALTH
EcON. 1382 (2008) (challenging the social-networks explanation).
92. See generally Russell Korobkin, Libertarian Welfarism, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 1651 (2009).
93. As a result, measures that reduce willpower lapses can have the fortunate side effect of reducing
externalities; by the same token, some externality-control measures can help people to achieve greater
individual well-being. See, e.g., Mark Dodd, Obesity and Time-Inconsistent Preferences, 2 OBESITY RES.
CLINICAL PRAc. 83, 87 (2008).
94. This appears to be true in a basic physiological sense. Recent work has linked the exercise of
willpower to the brain's use of glucose. See Matthew T. Gailliot et al., Self-Control Relies on Glucose
as a Limited Energy Source: Willpower Is More Than a Metaphor, 92 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
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immediately before attempting a set of (unsolvable) puzzles gave up more
quickly on the puzzles than those permitted to eat the cookies and those in a
control condition involving no food at all.9 From this and similar studies,
researchers have concluded that, in the short run at least,9 6 willpower works like
a muscle that can become fatigued with use.97 More broadly, self-control seems
to share a common, depletable fund with other cognitive tasks, such as decision
making. 98 Although the empirical work in this area leaves a number of impor-
tant questions unanswered,99 and ongoing work suggests some qualifications, 00
the notion that willpower exertions are taxing seems quite robust. o
If the stock of willpower is limited in the relatively short run, people may
maximize overall intertemporal success by giving in to relatively innocuous
temptations. 102 Thus, we may see in some willpower lapses the analogue of
325 (2007); Matthew T. Gailliot & Roy F. Baumeister, The Physiology of Willpower: Linking Blood
Glucose to Self-Control, 11 PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. REv. 303 (2007).
95. Roy F. Baumeister et al., Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource? 74 J. PERSONAL-
rry & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1252, 1255 (1998). The subjects who had to resist the cookies were instructed to
eat radishes instead, ostensibly as part of a study of taste. Other subjects were instructed to eat the
cookies (or, alternatively, some chocolate candies) rather than the radishes. In both cases, the subjects
were left alone with both kinds of food, so that those told to eat radishes could have sneaked some
cookies instead. Interestingly, none did so-although some "radish condition" subjects went so far as to
pick up and sniff the cookies. Id.
96. The long run story seems to be rather different. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Baumeister et al., supra note 95, at 1255-56; Hagger et al., supra note 2 (providing a
meta-analysis of studies). Other studies involved initial tasks like suppressing a particular thought (such
as of a "white bear") or particular emotions (in reaction to sad and comic movies). See Mark Muraven
et al., Self-Control as Limited Resource: Regulatory Depletion Patterns, 74 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 774 (1998). In each case, these acts worsened subsequent performance on a cognitive or
endurance task. Id.; see also Baumeister & Vohs, supra note 30 (discussing studies on self-regulation).
98. See, e.g., Baumeister et al., supra note 95; Kathleen D. Vohs et al., Making Choices Impairs
Subsequent Self-Control: A Limited-Resource Account of Decision Making, Self-Regulation and Active
Initiative, 94 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 883 (2008); see also Baba Shiv & Alexander Fedorikhin,
Heart and Mind in Conflict: The Interplay ofAffect and Cognition in Consumer Decision Making. 26 J.
CONsuM. REs. 278, 282-86 (1999) (finding, in a study involving undergraduate students, a greater
tendency to choose unhealthy snacks following difficult cognitive exertions).
99. See, e.g., Hagger et al., supra note 2 (examining alternative explanations, moderating factors,
and possible extensions of the depletion model); Eric J. Johnson, Man, My Brain Is Tired: Linking
Depletion and Cognitive Effort in Choice, 18 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 14 (2008) (providing a concise
overview of some of the literature's unanswered questions and ongoing debates).
100. For example, Siegfried Dewitte, Sabrina Bruyneel, and Kelly Geyskens found that self-control
enhancement rather than depletion occurred when two tasks drawing on the same control processes
followed each other in succession. See Seigfried Dewitte et al., Self-Regulating Enhances Self-
Regulation in Subsequent Consumer Decisions Involving Similar Response Conflicts, 36 J. CONSUMER
RES. 394 (2009).
101. See Emre Ozdenoren et al., Willpower and the Optimal Control of Visceral Urges 1-3
(Resources for the Future Discussion, Working Paper No. 10-35, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1635350 (discussing prior literature and modeling willpower as a depletable resource that can
be drawn down by prior willpower exercises).
102. See Hagger et al., supra note 2, at 518 (discussing "conservation" of self-control reserves);
Loewenstein, supra note 31, at 61 (characterizing willpower as "a constrained resource" the efficient
use of which requires that it "be allocated selectively between alternative uses"); Ozdenoren et al.,
supra note 101 (modeling this allocation process).
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"rational ignorance" in the realms of decision making and information gather-
ing.10 3 If successfully applying willpower simply costs too much in a given
setting, whether because it reduces willpower in other domains or generally
depletes mental and emotional resources that would otherwise be used to
advance important personal or career goals, it might seem that people should
"choose their battles" and exhibit occasional willpower lapses.'04 However, the
costs associated with exercising self-control on a given occasion represent only
part of the story. Patterns of exertions over time can influence the costliness of
later exertions, and a willpower success or failure in one instance may carry
implications for the odds of succeeding or failing in later instances.
Other approaches to reducing exercise costs also carry risks. Consider the use
of personal rules.10 5 What makes these rules effective is their ability to raise the
stakes for any given lapse by bundling together a group of similar decisions. 10 6
But, as a result, a lapse may set a precedent and lead to further lapses. o7
Dieters, for example, may conclude after giving in to a piece of cake that "the
diet is 'blown"' (at least for the day) and that there is no additional harm to
eating as much as they like.10 8 Thus, lapses that seem cost justified on a given
occasion may be dangerous, unless they can be psychologically firewalled off
from later, similar occasions for which willpower will be needed.' 09 People can
103. See, e.g., HAROLD DEMsmz, Protecting You from Yourself, in FROM ECONOMIC MAN To ECONOMIC
SYSTEM: ESSAYS ON HuMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 21, 21 (2008) ("Perfection in
decision making is infinitely costly and consuming of time, so we are wise to accept a positive
probability of error and even wiser to tolerate higher probabilities if the cost of reducing error is
greater."); George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. EcON. 213, 224 (1961)
("Ignorance is like subzero weather: by a sufficient expenditure its effects upon people can be kept
within tolerable or even comfortable bounds, but it would be wholly uneconomic entirely to eliminate
all its effects.").
104. Loewenstein and O'Donoghue apply a "choosing-your-battles" approach to reduce another
category of costs-those that come from self-imposed, nonpecuniary penalties, such as fear and guilt,
applied to willpower lapses. George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, "We Can Do This the Easy Way
or the Hard Way": Negative Emotions, Self-Regulation, and the Law, 73 U. CI. L. REV. 183, 186-87,
204 fig.2 (2006); id. at 192-93, 206 fig.4 (explaining and illustrating how "guilt-free zones" could assist
in reducing certain costs associated with attempting to resist temptations that ultimately prove irresist-
ible). Perhaps for these reasons, some exercise regimens and diets expressly contemplate "cheat days."
I thank Leandra Lederman for this example.
105. See, e.g., AINSLIE, supra note 35, at 112-13.
106. See, e.g., id.; AINSLIE, supra note 85, at 142-73; B6nabou & Tirole, supra note 85.
107. See, e.g., George Ainslie, Beyond Microeconomics: Conflict Among Interests in a Multiple Self
as a Determinant of Value, in THE MULTIPLE SELF, supra note 27, at 133, 147; Roland B6nabou & Jean
Tirole, Self-Knowledge and Self-Regulation: An Economic Approach, in 1 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF Eco-
NoNC DECISIONS: RATIONALITY AND WELL-BEING 137, 151-59 (Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo eds.,
2003); B6nabou & Tirole, supra note 85, at 851-56.
108. C. Peter Herman & Janet Polivy, Dieting as an Exercise in Behavioral Economics, in TIE AND
DEcISION, supra note 18, at 459, 466-71.
109. See, e.g., Ainslie, supra note 107, at 148-49. An interesting question prompted by this line of
reasoning is whether tax policy could itself structure opportunities for "controlled lapses." Cf Fennell,
supra note 17, at 151-52 (discussing the possibility that tax refunds offer such a bounded exception);
Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 104, at 192-93, 206 fig.4 (discussing and depicting the effects
of "guilt-free zones").
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-also try to reduce exercise costs by simply making tempting choices unavail-
able. 1 o This strategy, too, could backfire, if willpower levels are mutable over
time and people have less than total control over the temptations that come their
way. The next section explains.
3. Erosion Costs
Exercise costs (and, by extension, failure costs) may change over time as a
result of patterns of exertions. Muscles not only become tired but can also get
stronger with regular use; these same characteristics appear to apply to will-
power.111 If exerting willpower makes one better at it, then efforts to avoid
temptations altogether may prove counterproductive. A related possibility is that
willpower can be developed by employing particular techniques. For example,
studies involving children and delayed gratification suggest that people can be
taught skills that enhance their ability to wait, such as pretending they are
looking at a picture of a treat rather than the actual treat, or distracting
themselves from the temptation. 1 1 2
The idea that willpower can be built up, or, alternatively, that it can atrophy
or erode, has received attention in the literature.H3 Experimental work by Mark
Muraven, Roy Baumeister, and Dianne Tice found evidence of a willpower
strength-training effect among participants who were assigned to practice cer-
tain self-control tasks, such as maintaining good posture, over a two week
period in between two experimental sessions. 114 If failing to exercise willpower
erodes the stock of self-control that can be accessed on future occasions, then
the long-run strategy for minimizing failure costs and exercise costs may
involve incurring more of both than could be justified based on a short-run
110. For the potential gains that might come from reducing one's choice set, see, for example, Faruk
Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Temptation and Self-Control, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1403 (2001).
111. See, e.g., Loewenstein, supra note 31, at 56-57; Ozdenoren et al., supra note 101, at 20-22; see
also Dewitte et al., supra note 100, at 396, 403 (questioning the muscle metaphor's assumption that
self-control resources cannot be enhanced in the short run and suggesting that task similarity can
produce short-run enhancements rather than depletions).
112. For an overview of this literature, see Walter Mischel et al., Sustaining Delay of Gratification
over ime: A Hot/Cool Systems Perspective, in TIME AND DEcisioN, supra note 18, at 175, 183-87.
113. See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral
and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1620, 1626-27 (2006) (suggesting that paternalistic policies
present a variety of "cognitive hazards" and could "undercut personal incentives to invest in cognitive
capital"); Bailey Kuklin, Self-Paternalism in the Marketplace, 60 U. CN. L. REv. 649, 667 (1992)(raising and countering the argument that precommitment would "undermine self-discipline and thwart
the goals of moral strength and virtue"); id. at 666 & n.36 (discussing the related argument that placing
alternatives out of reach will deprive consumers of learning opportunities and the related strengthening
of "moral fiber" and connecting this point to Mills's "'moral muscles argument' [against] paternalism").
114. See Mark Muraven et al., Longitudinal Improvement of Self-Regulation Through Practice:
Building Self-Control Strength Through Repeated Exercise, 139 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 446 (1999). The study
found that participants who had exercised certain forms of self-control were less vulnerable to depletion
effects. The authors concluded that "[i]t is good to exert self-control on a regular basis because in the
long run, these exercises will strengthen self-control and make a person less susceptible to the depleting
effects of a single exertion." Id. at 456; see also Hagger et al., supra note 2, at 518 (discussing and




Additional empirical work might be directed not only at investigating the
longer term effects of exercising willpower but also the broader cultural spread
of willpower norms. For example, although different age cohorts exhibit differ-
ent savings behaviors and monetary attitudes,116 we know little about the
intergenerational or societal transmission of willpower.
D. UNDERSTANDING WILLPOWER HETEROGENEITY
Although intertemporal struggles are universal, willpower problems do not
affect everyone to the same degree. This is due in part to circumstances
unrelated to willpower itself, such as opportunities for temptation, but individu-
als also differ in how they respond to the same circumstances. Put in the terms
introduced above, people with self-control problems operate in an intrapersonal
environment marked by high transaction costs, while people with high levels of
willpower operate in an intrapersonal transaction cost environment that more
closely approximates the Coasean ideal." 7 When willpower lapses occur, we
might posit some sort of communication breakdown between the "controller"
self and the acting self.'" 8 The controller self cannot broker a deal between the
current self and various future selves because the acting self has become
unreachable or unamenable to bargaining, perhaps as a result of strong visceral
influences. ' 9 While such communication breakdowns may happen occasionally
to everyone, we might regard those for whom they are especially pronounced
and frequent as having low willpower levels.
Alternatively, we might say that people have low willpower when their
exercise costs are unusually high relative to the efficacy of those exertions in
reducing failure costs. Although everyone may suffer spikes in exercise costs
from time to time, people with low willpower levels may have chronically
elevated exercise costs due to some kind of vulnerability or past erosion of
willpower, or they may simply lack skills that would lower those exercise costs
115. Some critics of interventions premised on cognitive shortfalls, including self-control, have
emphasized the possibility that these efforts would have unintended effects on learning or internal
controls. See, e.g., Klick & Mitchell, supra note 113, at 1631-32; Whitman & Rizzo, supra note 39, at
430-33; see also B6nabou & Tirole, supra note 107, at 155-56 (noting possibility that self-control
might not develop as well under "tight external constraints").
116. For analyses of generational differences in views about money, see, for example, PErER K. LuNir
& SoNIA M. LivINGSTONE, MASS CONSUMFYION AND PERSONAL IDENTFFY 101-32 (1992); Teresa R. Daniel,
Delay of Consumption and Saving Behavior: Some Preliminary, Empirical Outcomes, in ADVANCES IN
EcoNoMIC PSYCHOLOGY 171, 180 (Gerrit Antonides et al. eds., 1997).
117. See sources cited supra note 78. This binary classification is a simplification; people obviously
occupy a continuum with respect to willpower and also exhibit variation within their own lives.
118. See Elster, supra note 27, at 6 (positing some "breakdown of internal communication").
119. See generally George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65
ORGANIZATIONAL BEaAv. & HUM. DECISION PRocEssEs 272 (1996). The idea that future selves are
represented in willpower struggles, albeit imperfectly, is an implication of the two-self model that is
often used to model self-control problems. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
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systematically, such as the use of distraction techniques or personal rules.120
'U. THREE APPROACHES TO WILLPOWER
How might tax policy best respond to willpower heterogeneity? I will start by
setting aside practical difficulties in observing willpower levels and consider the
question at the level of theory. Three divergent responses come to mind. First,
we might funnel resources to low-willpower types to compensate them for their
lower utility levels. Second, we might attempt to turn low-willpower types into
high-willpower types by using penalties or subsidies to reprice gaps between
their actual consumption patterns and their optimal available consumption plans
(OACPs).121 Third, we might try to directly deliver consumption outcomes to
the low-willpower crowd that more closely approximate those of the high-
willpower group by blocking or forcing certain consumption choices. These
strategies-compensation, repricing, and choice reduction-do not exhaust the
policy choice set, but they do offer useful starting points. Elements of each can
be seen in existing and proposed tax policies, as I will discuss in Part III.
A. COMPENSATING FOR LOW WILLPOWER
An equity-based rationale for reducing tax burdens on low-willpower individu-
als can be approached from either of two directions. 12 2 First, willpower might
be considered an element of ability,12 3 which is generally taken to be the proper
theoretical target of taxation. 1 2 4 Individuals may substitute self-control for the
exercise of other abilities in the paid labor market; both willpower and work can
120. See supra text accompanying notes 105-12.
121. For a discussion of the OACP and its role in willpower analysis, see supra section I.B.2.
122. An efficieicy-based rationale might also apply if it turns out that low-willpower people have
more elastic labor supply than others. Cf Michael Kremer, Should Taxes Be Independent of Age?
14-15 (Sept. 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/
kremer/fileslTAXESAGE_9_2001A_Clean.pdf (discussing an analogous elasticity-based efficiency ra-
tionale for basing taxes on age).
123. A distinct argument would be that willpower signals something about ability. The related idea
that savings might serve as an "indicator good" has been explored. See Bankman and Weisbach,
Superiority, supra note 3, at 1453-55; Emmanuel Saez, The Desirability of Commodity Taxation Under
Non-Linear Income Taxation and Heterogeneous Tastes, 83 J. Pua. ECoN. 217, 227-28 (2002); see also
Chris William Sanchirico, Tax Eclecticism, 64 TAX L. REv. (forthcoming 2011), draft available at
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1491130 (discussing how observable taxable attributes can convey informa-
tion relevant to social welfare). Using a particular trait as an indicator makes sense only when it is more
readily observable than the real variable of interest; if the presence or absence of willpower can only be
inferred from looking at yet another set of behaviors, it does not hold much promise as an indicator
good in its own right.
124. For discussion of this point, see, for example, Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Endowment, 55 DuKE
L.J. 1145 (2006), and Shaviro, supra note 3, at 752 (explaining that according to the optimal income tax
literature, "the attribute of interest is ... ability, whether or not exercised" but noting that this is still "a
turtle shy" of the ultimate focus of tax policy-the "effect on social welfare"). For an interesting
analysis of how personal attributes other than ability relate to tax progressivity, see Jeff Strnad, The
Progressivity Puzzle: The Key Role of Personal Attributes (Stanford.Law Sch. John M. Olin Program in
Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 293, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 10289 (examining
the implications of "materialism" and "work affinity" for the tax rate structure).
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enable people to advance their own well-being, and both may make similar
draws on a limited stock of cognitive resources. On this account, exertions of
willpower are a form of nonmarket production, akin to untaxed production that
occurs within the home. 1 2 5
Second, willpower levels may work as amplifiers or dampeners in converting
marketable talents and skills into well-being over the life cycle. Holding income
constant, 12 6 low-willpower people are less able to achieve the consumption plan
that they deem best and are consequently less well off than their high-willpower
counterparts. If tax policy's distributive goals are benchmarked to lifetime
well-being, then those goals cannot be achieved without somehow accounting
for differences in willpower. 12 7 But it is not obvious which way this heterogene-
ity would cut. As Daniel Shaviro has observed, the fact that myopia keeps some
individuals from acting as good consumers in translating income into utility
could support either redistribution toward the myopes or, alternatively, shifting
money away from the myopes and toward those who are better able to generate
utility with the same resources. 12 8 Where one comes out on this issue depends
both on empirical assessments about marginal utility and on the social welfare
function in use.129
Either of these approaches might point in the direction of a tax policy that
compensates for low willpower. Moral hazard presents a principal counterargu-
ment. Because compensating people for low willpower levels reduces the cost
associated with being a low-willpower type, we might expect to see more
125. On the distributive effects of untaxed household production, see Chris William Sanchirico,
Progressivity and Potential Income: Measuring the Effect of Changing Work Patterns on Income Tax
Progressivity, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1551 (2008).
126. The possibility that willpower may itself correlate with income or wealth levels is discussed
below. See infra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
127. Indeed, the capacity to wring more lifetime welfare out of a given income stream would seem
to be just as relevant to tax policy's distributive goals as the talents and skills that produce the income
stream in the first place. Yet, tax policy does not ordinarily respond to heterogeneity in one's skill as a
consumer. See Shaviro, supra note 3, at 758; see also Warren, supra note 7, at 1096-97 (rejecting
realized utility as an appropriate tax base).
128. Shaviro, supra note 3, at 785. As Shaviro explains, myopic individuals are likely-to have lower
total utility than "abler consumers," which might support redistribution in their favor on egalitarian
principles. Id. Other things being equal, however, we would expect a nonmyopic person to derive more
marginal utility from a dollar because she would do a better job of timing her consumption so as to
maximize utility. See id. But the story becomes less clear if the marginal utility of money varies
depending on total utility levels. See id. Moreover, myopic individuals may suffer from severe liquidity
crunches as a result of their own ill-timed consumption choices; this might cause a well-timed infusion
of cash to generate a great deal of marginal utility for them, even if dollars dropped at random into their
life cycles would not.
129. See, e.g., id. A utilitarian social welfare function would focus on marginal utility alone, in an
effort to wring the largest amount of utility out of each dollar. See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 55 at 73.
In contrast, if society's distributive goals involve providing at least a threshold amount of well-being
for each individual, people who are less skilled at translating money into utility will need more
resources to reach that threshold and thus might receive transfers whether their marginal utility is
higher or lower than that of other people. See id. (exploring this point in the context of people with
disabilities).
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people of this type emerge over time. The size of the response depends in part
on the respective roles of effort and endowment in producing willpower. If, as
suggested above, the exercise of willpower always requires at least some effort,
then people might be expected to shift their limited energies to other endeavors
if self-control no longer produces large marginal gains. A wrinkle here is that
exertions of effort that take place in the labor market are already taxed, so it is
possible that we already have inefficiently large expenditures of effort on
untaxed factors like willpower.13 0 Although the issues are complex, a concern
remains that compensation for low willpower levels would only serve to
exacerbate the condition that led to compensation in the first place.1 3 1
In some respects, the design challenges resemble those in other settings
where social arrangements can influence the "exchange rate" at which money is
translated into utility. In the disability context, for example, changing certain
features of the social environment (such as the pervasive use of stairs) could
change the amount of marginal utility that a person with a disability gets out of
the marginal dollar. 13 2 Similarly, restructuring societal arrangements to make
things easier on those with low willpower could change the degree to which
earned income translates into utility for those individuals. Such arrangements
might include the in-kind distribution of tools (such as precommitment devices)
for better leveraging of utility or a greater degree of intrapersonal redistribution
from the low-willpower person's low-marginal-utility states to her high-marginal-
utility states. 13 3
In a different vein, John Roemer suggests an interesting way to dodge
moral-hazard concerns while pursuing equality of opportunity: basing distribu-
tive outcomes not on an individual's absolute level of effort, but rather on how
her effort ranks within the effort distribution for her relevant comparison
group. 13 4 Thus, if Person A and Person B are members of two different groups
130. Yet another consideration is that low willpower can manifest itself not only in choices between
consumption and savings but also in choices between leisure and labor. To the extent that low-
willpower people work less than high-willpower people, the existing tax system already offers them a
break. Yet even if myopic low-willpower people are more ready to substitute leisure for labor, other
things equal, they might also find themselves more frequently in binds (assuming imperfect liquidity)
requiring work just for survival. It is even possible that they would strategically engineer such binds to
force themselves to work. See Peter Diamond & Botond Koszegi, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and
Retirement, 87 J. Pus. EcON. 1839, 1841, 1859 (2003) (discussing such "strategic undersaving"). People
with low willpower might also respond to their known propensities by locking themselves into jobs that
do not offer much flexibility. Finally, some low-willpower people are hyperopic and would presumably
be less ready to substitute leisure for labor.
131. Cf Bankman & Weisbach, Consumption, supra note 3, at 800-01 (making this point about low
savings levels, which might be indicative of myopia).
132. See Weisbach, supra note 55, at 65-66, 98 (discussing the social model of disability and the
stairs example, as well as the possibility that the latter may have public-goods characteristics).
133. For a low-willpower person, the marginal utility derived from a given dollar depends crucially
on when it is received-how near or far from the person's optimal point of consumption. See supra
note 128; see also infra section IV.B.2 (discussing intrapersonal redistribution).
134. JOHN E. RoEMER, EQUAI.rY OF OPPoRruNrfY 15 (1998). For a related discussion of "responsibility-
sensitive metrics," including those developed by Roemer, see ADLER, supra note 73, at ch. 8, pt. III.
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that exhibit different effort distributions, and both A and B are in the 95th
percentile in terms of effort for their respective groups, then both would be
deemed to have tried equally hard under Roemer's theory and would be entitled
to equal outcomes-even though A's absolute level of effort might be lower or
higher than B's.1 Whatever one may think of the proposal as a general
approach to distributive justice, there is an interesting "power equalization"
feature at its heart that has traction in combating moral hazard concerns: society
rewards individuals whose efforts exceed those of their reference group."'
Applying the idea to the present context, we might seek to direct resources in
a manner that benefits relatively high-willpower individuals within low-
willpower groups. If we did not have to worry about "imitators"-high-
willpower individuals who would try to slip into low-willpower groups -
then such a plan would combine movement of resources to low-willpower
individuals with rewards for exerting willpower effort. Significantly, however,
rewarding willpower effort (even within low-willpower groups) means placing
at a relative disadvantage those who exhibit less willpower. Thus, although I
have included this approach under the rubric of compensating for low will-
power, it incorporates strains of a quite opposite approach, to which I now turn.
B. REPRICING WILLPOWER LAPSES
Policymakers might respond to the fact that low-willpower people are less
well off than high-willpower people by attempting to (further) deter people
from willpower 'lapses. A system of rewards and penalties based on how well
people manage intertemporal dilemmas could lead to fewer low-willpower
types and more high-willpower types. Because "sin taxes" can be characterized
as a rough attempt to enact this idea, much of the analysis of this approach will
be taken up below in the course of discussing those instruments.13 8 But some
initial observations will help to highlight considerations that apply to this
approach, even in the counterfactual case where willpower levels are observ-
able.139
One issue involves the possibility that penalties will fail to deter willpower
lapses. Individuals who do not stick to their OACPs are already made worse off
as a result. Because low-willpower people seem to be acting irrationally-
failing to do what is in their best interest-it is not clear how responsive they
135. RoEsiER, supra note 134, at 14-15.
136. As Roemer explains, the group as a whole might have less incentive to improve its distribution,
but because individual members within it have an incentive to rise to the top of the group, the
distribution would be expected to improve as well. Id. at 35.
137. Cf Weisbach, supra note 55, at 85-87 (discussing problem of "mimicking" in the disability
context).
138. See infra section m.C.
139. As discussed below, the possibility that such interventions will distort the choices of people
without willpower problems presents a central concern. But even if we know that an individual suffers
from low willpower, there may still be difficulties in pricing lapses appropriately.
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will be to additional disincentives." Yet sometimes the problem with existing
disincentives is not that they are too low, but rather that they are temporally
misplaced. 141 Thus, policy instruments that move penalties to the temporal point
at which willpower must be applied, raising the price of a lapse in currency that
will not be discounted, could offer fresh traction on intertemporal dilemmas. 14 2
There is another problem, however. If low-willpower individuals do not
respond to the price change that the government has introduced, then they will
be made even worse off than before, relative to high-willpower people.14 3 They
must not only pay the new, higher price associated with the willpower lapse
(now) but also suffer the effects of the lapse in their own lives (later). This
result is difficult to justify on distributive grounds. Of course, if certain kinds of
willpower lapses produce especially large externalities, repricing them could
make good policy sense regardless of the impact on people's own well-being.'44
In that case, however, the policy justification would lie in the externalities
themselves, not in concerns about willpower; the justification would apply with
equal force to decisions made by people who hold consistent preferences for the
externality-producing choice.
Finally, even if people do respond to governmentally engineered price changes,
the fact that willpower lapses may substitute for each other makes the net effect
unclear. Unless a policy mechanism can capture the entire universe of lapses,
additional willpower exertions in one realm may be matched by additional or
more severe lapses in another realm.14 5 For example, penalizing people for a
failure to save money might lead to better savings habits but worse health
habits. 146 An even broader concern is raised by the fact that willpower may
draw on a general store of cognitive powers, so that increasing the application
of willpower may diminish effectiveness in other decisional or attentional
realms.14 7 For example, perhaps tightly controlling certain aspects of discretion-
140. Cf DEmz, supra note 103, at 25-26 (critiquing Robert Frank's suggestion of a progressive
consumption tax as an antidote to competitive consumption by asking, "If the wealthy cannot discipline
themselves to reduce expenditures on luxury goods, why do they react sensibly to a tax-imposed
increase in the cost of a unit of stature?").
141. See Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 104, at 189 (observing that future punishments or
rewards designed to deter vice "are generally likely to be ineffective for the very reason that people
succumb to vices in the first place-because people tend to put disproportionate weight on costs and
benefits that are immediate relative to those that are delayed, and more generally have a hard time fully
attending to future consequences").
142. Imposing a tax on the present self may be easier said than done, however. See Whitman &
Rizzo, supra note 39, at 428-29 (noting if a person subjected to a sin tax is able to borrow or has
accumulated savings, a later self can be made to pay the tax).
143. See Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 104, at 190; Strnad, supra note 11, at 1254-55;
infra text accompanying notes 209-10.
144. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 92, at 1673-83 (examining externality-based rationales for
policy interventions).
145. For a recent paper examining the possibility that willpower exercised in one realm may leave
less for use in another realm, see Ozdenoren et al., supra note 101.
146. See id. at 15-17 (modeling the case where willpower has alternative uses).
147. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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ary consumption means paying less attention to the details of one's mortgage or
performing less effectively on the job.
C. CONSTRICTING CHOICE
A third approach would seek to close the utility gap between high-willpower
people and low-willpower people by blocking or mandating particular choices.14 8
Our discussion above established that willpower can only operate within the
space that is left open by the framework of external constraints. The tighter
those constraints, the less willpower matters. A complete ban on borrowing, or
strict limits on consumption choices, would make self-control less relevant.
Similarly, forced savings or mandatory spending would constrain the available
choice set. If applied across the board to people who vary as to willpower but
are otherwise identical, such constraints would squeeze out some of the differ-
ences in well-being that willpower presently generates. Indeed, intelligently
formulated restrictions could do more than that; to the extent they replicated
what well-informed people without willpower problems would choose, they
could raise overall well-being levels for low-willpower people without a corre-
sponding drop in well-being for high-willpower people.
Directly improving well-being by limiting choice has some advantages over
applying penalties to willpower shortfalls. Even if repricing lapses alters the
extent to which they occur, the effort of engaging in self-control would re-
main. 149 Not so if a choice is simply placed out of reach.150 An even more
compelling advantage of placing choices out of reach is that the individual will
never be required to bear both the cost of the lapse itself and an additional
societal penalty. t5 1 Moreover, unlike a transfer of funds to people who exhibit
low willpower, these direct well-being improvements do not present an obvious
moral hazard in inducing willpower reductions.
Nonetheless, the costs of limiting choice may be prohibitively high. When
applied to people without willpower problems, such constraints compromise the
ability to rearrange consumption without conferring offsetting benefits. Even if
148. Mandatory retirement savings programs are a prominent real-world example. See infra section
m.D.
149. Ian Ayres has suggested that "commitment contracts" under which people stand to lose
significant amounts of staked money would "take a future choice off the table" and thereby reduce the
costs of exercising self-control-although he acknowledges "this is pure speculation." IAN AYRES,
CARROTS AND STnCKS: UNLOCK THE POWER OF INCENTVEs To GET THiNGs DONE 162 (2010). Because such
contracts do not actually remove choice but instead only reprice lapses, it seems questionable that they
could entirely short-circuit the self-deliberation associated with exercising self-control. However,
perhaps large potential forfeitures would lead people to create and heed bright-line rules that would
reduce exercise costs considerably. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
150. We would need to know, however, whether the deprivation itself produces any sort of depletion
effect, even aside from the exercise of willpower. See Fennell, supra note 13, at 99-100.
151. Note, however, that one response to this "double payment" problem would involve holding the
fines in trust for the individual's later self, or making the fines into a kind of forced insurance purchase.
See Strnad, supra note 11, at 1254. Thus, we can understand at least some "penalty" schemes as
containing elements of forced decisions. See infra text accompanying note 212.
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Table 1. Strategies and Costs
Strategy
Constricting
Costs Compensation Penalties/Subsidies Choice
Failure Costs lower per failure higher per failure eliminated
but more failures but fewer failures
Exercise Costs lower in short run higher in short run eliminated
Erosion Costs higher lower or negative higher
constrained choice sets could be selectively applied to those who struggle with
self-control issues, information problems would remain. Unless OACPs are
fully observable, it would not be clear which choices should be removed. 15 2
Another concern is that reducing the choice set and thereby eliminating the need
to exert willpower could weaken the development of that trait.153 Whether we
should worry about such a result depends in part on whether we view the
quality of willpower as something valuable in itself for a culture to inculcate,15 4
or as merely instrumental to achieving OACPs (and hence dispensable if
OACPs can be achieved through other means).
D. TAKING STOCK
Table 1 summarizes how the three basic approaches to willpower heterogene-
ity surveyed above-directing resources toward low-willpower individuals,
penalizing willpower lapses, and forcing better choices-interact with the three
costs of self-control problems introduced earlier-failure costs, exercise costs,
and erosion costs. The entries in the table assume idealized, error-free applica-
tions of the strategies; later, I take up the informational burdens that each
approach entails, which raise the risk of mistakes.
First, consider the compensation strategy. Compensating for low willpower
reduces the cost of each failure; the stakes of doing a poor intertemporal job are
lessened through societal transfers. We might expect the transfers to also reduce
exercise costs; after all, people presumably only exercise willpower to avoid
failure, and the stakes of failure have now been lowered. This looks like a cost
152. To the extent that people have access to their own OACPs (or some approximation), however,
they might provide input into the construction of the choice set, as through a voluntary precommitment
mechanism. Precommitment will be discussed further in Part IV.
153. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 33, at 32 ("Social security prevents the younger self from selling
the older self down the river, although at the same time it weakens the future-oriented self by reducing
the benefits of thrift. . . .").
154. See id. at 29-30 (noting potential cultural influences on "the relative strength of one's
present-oriented and future-oriented selves" and observing that public policies, such as those that tax




savings. With exercise efforts reduced, however, failures become more likely,
even if each is made less costly by societal transfers.15 5 Hence, we would
expect more failures, making the net effect on failure costs ambiguous. Further,
because buffering failure reduces the marginal returns to willpower, there may
be erosion costs associated with willpower atrophy over time.
Penalizing willpower lapses takes exactly the opposite approach.' 5 6 By ampli-
fying failure costs, penalties make failure even more painful than before. One
would expect people to react by increasing their efforts to resist failure. These
efforts will increase exercise costs, but they will also presumably reduce failure
costs. When failure does occur, however, it produces a triple whammy: exercise
costs, ordinary failure costs, and the added penalty."' Erosion costs are avoided;
if anything, the increased exercise of willpower induced by the penalty should
help to build up willpower over the long run. Again, the overall effects on
well-being are uncertain; we would need to know how sensitive people are to
penalties, how expensive willpower is to exercise, and how likely it is to fail
even when exercised to the best of a person's ability.
The third approach, forcing particular choices, cleanly avoids both exercise
costs and failure costs. Returning to our transaction-cost analysis, it would be as
if an omniscient judge simply awarded the entitlement to the higher valuing
user in a land use dispute, thus sidestepping the costs and risks of relying on
bargaining. Yet we might have concerns about erosion costs, especially if the
"judge" will not always be there to make the right choice for our various selves.
Failure costs and exercise costs would continue to exact a higher price in utility
from low-willpower people in any sphere in which the forced choice did not
operate.
The entries in Table 1 gloss over some additional costs that would be present
in any real-world willpower intervention. In particular, the informational bur-
dens presented by the various approaches deserve attention. Even if we could
identify low-willpower people, doing so would not resolve problems surround-
155. See Bankman & Weisbach, Superiority, supra note 3, at 1447 (suggesting that nontaxation of
savings in an effort to help myopic people would lead to an undoing of that help through further myopic
behavior).
156. We can say the same of subsidizing willpower successes. Even though a subsidy sounds less
punitive than a tax, it still treats those who fail to engage in the preferred conduct worse in relative
terms-which is not to say that it would necessarily produce equivalent results. See Saul Levmore,
Carrots and Torts, in CHuCAGo LEcTuREs IN LAW AND EcoNosucs 203, 205 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000)
("Analytically equivalent rewards and penalties might produce very different reactions because most of
us do not process information as automatons."). For a recent paper modeling the effects of savings
subsidies in the presence of self-control problems, see Per L. Krusell et al., Temptation and Taxation, 78
ECONOMETRICA 2063 (2010). See also Weiss, supra note 52, at 1298-99 (noting that a subsidy for
savings could correct for a myopic discount rate).
157. In addition to governmental penalties, people often self-inflict nonpecuniary penalties like guilt
and regret, and might also be subject to shaming or stigma penalties from society or from their
reference group. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. Cm. L. REv. 133
(2006); Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 104, at 183. All of these penalties have the same effect
of increasing the costs of failure. When the deterrent does not work, people incur failure costs that have
been accordingly amplified.
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ing the determination of OACPs or the appropriate levels at which to set any
penalties or subsidies-and these determinations would be essential to keeping
error costs low under either a repricing or choice-elimination strategy. The
strategy of compensating low-willpower people requires little information be-
yond willpower levels, but presents heightened incentive problems. Further, to
the extent we cannot observe or find workable proxies for willpower levels, we
must worry not only about people losing their willpower in fact, but also about
people pretending to do so.
111. WILLPOWER AND TAX POLICY
The discussion above abstracted away from the identification problems that
beset efforts to address willpower in the real world. In this Part, I take a
different tack. Rather than ask in an idealized manner what society ought to do
about willpower heterogeneity, I ask what impacts, whether intended or unin-
tended, existing and proposed tax policy decisions might have on people of
varying willpower levels. As we will see, some approaches have the effect of
directing resources to low-willpower people, others have the effect of penaliz-
ing willpower lapses, and still others operate by blocking or forcing choices. I
will also consider the role of "choice architecture" that seeks to shape decisions
without using force or overtly negative or positive incentives.15 8
A. LIFETIME AND SUBLIFETIME TAX PERIODS
A perennial question in tax policy that has received significant recent atten-
tion involves the length of the tax period."' William Vickrey's proposal of
lifetime averaging would make the taxpayer's lifetime the taxable period,.with
annual collections based on a running average. 160 Variations on this theme, such
as averaging over a shorter span of years, have appeared in the literature,16 ' and
some limited averaging provisions have appeared in the tax code. 162 Lengthen-
ing the tax period is often recommended on grounds of horizontal equity. Within
a progressive system, people with fluctuating earnings will face higher marginal
rates during high-earning years and lower marginal rates during low-earning
years. The highs are not counterbalanced by the lows, however, and these
fluctuating earners are disadvantaged by the tax system relative to people who
158. See RIcHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SuNsTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONs ABOUT HEALrH,
WEACH, AND HAPPINESS 11-13 (2008).
159. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered, 40 HARv. J. ON
LEGIs. 395 (2003); Neil H. Buchanan, The Case Against Income Averaging, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1151
(2006); Fennell & Stark, supra note 5; Shaviro, supra note 3; Liebman, supra note 4.
160. William Vickrey, Averaging of Income for Income-Tax Purposes, 47 J. POL. EcON. 379 (1939).
161. See, e.g., Batchelder, supra note 159, at 397-99, 421-36.
162. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1301 (2006) (permitting farming and fishing income to be spread over the
preceding three taxable years at the taxpayer's election); I.R.C. §§ 1301-1305 (1982), repealed by Tax
Reform Act of 1986, § 141(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2117; see also Richard Schmalbeck, Income Averaging
After Twenty Years: A Failed Experiment in Horizontal Equity, 1984 DUKE L.J. 509 (describing and
critiquing income averaging provisions).
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earn the same aggregate amount in a steady pattern.' 6 3 If we believe that both
ability and ability to pay are more closely keyed to multiyear or lifetime
earnings than to annual earnings, longer tax periods seem sensible.
But using a longer tax period also means treating equivalently people who
earn in different patterns within that longer period. According to the life-cycle
hypothesis, different earning patterns should have no impact on well-being,
because people can simply rearrange money within the life cycle to fund
whatever consumption pattern is optimal. As we have seen, matters are not quite
so simple. Another way of framing the question of the appropriate tax period is
to ask whether all 'of the "selves" that make up an individual's life should be
considered part of the same taxable unit.lM When tax or benefit policies place
family members or others into units, what seems most important is the expecta-
tion that resources will be shared among the members. 1 6 5 If resources will in
fact be shared between two people, it is administratively wasteful to tax one of
them only to make redistributive payments to the other. More controversially,
principles of horizontal equity might be thought to constrain the degree to
which two resource-sharing units with the same total earnings should be treated
differently based on how their earnings are divided up among their respective
members. 166
In exploring whether temporal selves should be grouped together for tax
purposes, then, we might want to examine how resource sharing works among
them.16 7 We want to know not only whether the selves are able to share
resources (i.e., free of external constraints on borrowing or saving), but also
whether they are willing to do so (a question of willpower). What impact does
the choice of tax period have on high-willpower and low-willpower people,
163. See Vickrey, supra note 160, at 379; Fennell & Stark, supra note 5, at 28 & tbl.1.
164. See Zelenak, supra note 70, at 361-62.
165. See id. at 361 (observing that if economic identification or responsibility represents the
principle upon which taxable units are formed, "a similar argument could be made for treating a
younger self and an older self as a single tax equity unit, even if their status as separate persons is
conceded").
166. The desire to treat equal-earning couples equally clashes irreconcilably with the desire to treat
equal-earning individuals equally regardless of marital status, if a progressive tax rate schedule is in
place. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Intermediate Filing in Household Taxation, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 145,
147 (1998) (asserting that "marriage neutrality, couples neutrality, and progressive rates are incompat-
ible"). If members of a married couple take turns as the primary breadwinner, then grouping their
incomes together for tax purposes over short temporal periods would have much the same effect as
taxing each of them as individuals and lengthening the time period over which tax liability is
calculated. Although it is unlikely that many households exhibit this precise pattern, it is worth noting
that grouping different people together may substitute in some degree for the grouping together of
different temporal selves.
167. The interaction between interpersonal and intrapersonal groupings would also require attention.
It would be technically challenging (at best) to continue with the policy of grouping together different
people into taxable units while also attempting to group together different temporal selves, given that
people do not stay in the same household configurations throughout their lifetimes. See Zelenak, supra
note 70, at 356 (discussing Vickrey's recognition of and approach to this problem in the context of his
lifetime averaging proposal).
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Table 2. Four Earners
Period
Earner Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 All Years
A (high willpower) 10 10 10 10 40
B (low willpower) 10 10 10 10 40
C (high willpower) 20 0 .20 0 40
D (low willpower) 20 0 20 0 40
respectively? The answer turns out to be more complicated- than it might seem
at first, and is best approached with an example. Table 2 shows the wage
earnings of four people, A, B, C, and D over a four-year period, ignoring
interest. As indicated in parentheses, A and C are high-willpower individuals,
whereas B and D are low-willpower individuals. Assume that each of the four
individuals has an optimal available consumption plan (OACP) 6 9 that would
involve perfect smoothing of consumption over the years, and that borrowing is
unavailable. Suppose further that the self-control problems experienced by the
low-willpower individuals, B and D, mean that income tends to be consumed
very near the point at which it is earned.
A tax that is based on the entire period would treat all four individuals
equally. But are they equally well off? Taxpayers A and B are in exactly the
same position on both an annual and whole-period basis; they would be taxed
equivalently regardless of which of these tax periods is chosen. Taxpayer A
would have the ability to rearrange her income into a different consumption
pattern, but because her earnings happen to fall into the same pattern as her
OACP, she need not do so. Taxpayer B's low willpower renders him unable to
rearrange his earnings into a better consumption pattern, but again, this does not
matter because his earning pattern happens to match up with his OACP. What
about C and D? C can easily (and, we will assume, costlessly) rearrange her
earnings to match her OACP. Despite her fluctuating earning pattern, she is, in
terms of consumption possibilities, in exactly the same position as A and B. D,
however, lacks the willpower necessary to rearrange his earnings to match his
OACP. His earnings "stick" and are consumed where they fall, which, unhap-
pily, does not turn out to be his optimal pattern.
Consider now how the choice of tax period affects the four individuals.
Annual taxation would treat A and B (steady earners) better than C and D
(uneven earners) within a progressive tax system. That would mean treating C,
who is relevantly like A and B, differently. Whole-period taxation would treat
all four alike. This would remove the artificial distinction that the annual tax
168. Savings and investment income is ignored in this simple example.
169. See supra section I.B.2.
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system draws between A and B on the one hand, and C on the other, but it
would also sweep D, who seems to be relevantly different, into the same tax
category. We might think that D would prefer this; it would cause his fluctuating
earnings to be taxed the same way as the steady earnings of A and B. The
annual tax period taxed his fluctuating earnings more heavily, and we might
think that the last thing D needs is a heavier tax burden.
But the story is not so clear cut. The tax system does not just redistribute
among different people, it also redistributes intrapersonally through the life
cycle. At times, it does this in obvious ways (as through payroll taxes and Social
Security benefits). Less recognized is the fact that the application of progressive
rates to annual periods throughout the life cycle moves money from higher
income selves to lower income selves. 170 An annual tax system thus places
one's current self in the same distributive relationship with one's own poorer
and richer selves as with all poorer and richer (temporal versions of) other
people.17 1 And D may need redistribution from his other selves even more than
he needs a tax break. C, however, can do just fine without intrapersonal
redistribution. Under an annual tax system, C would cross-subsidize the tax
system's regularization of D's income by being part of the pool of fluctuating
earners to whom higher tax rates are applied.
Of course, earning patterns are not necessarily exogenous. Another way of
looking at the story is to suppose that taxing fluctuating earners more heavily
will induce more people to become regular earners. This is usually viewed as a
distortion, and another reason for favoring lifetime taxation.17 2 But if many
people struggle with self-control problems, further inducing them to take up
earning patterns that are likely to more closely match their OACPs could be
valuable. The lifetime tax period would not have that effect, although it might
still encourage people to develop more willpower. D in our story could improve
his situation by being more like C under a lifetime system, or by being more
like B under an annual system. Which move is the more achievable goal for
people with self-control problems may bear on our choice of tax periods.
There are many additional issues that I can only touch on briefly here. First,
not all self-control problems take the form of consumption too closely tracking
earnings. It is also possible for people to act hyperopically and push consump-
tion too far away from the point at which money is earned. Second, not
everyone wants to smooth out their consumption. If people wish to pile up
170. For discussion of this point, see, for example, Polinsky, supra note 5, at 229-33; Fennell &
Stark, supra note 5, at 42-45. This assumes that taxes are used to provide goods and services that are
spread among the community on some basis other than the amount of current-year taxes paid. See
Zelenak, supra note 70, at 368 n.165.
171. The textual statement assumes the same structure of tax rates persists over time, which will not
necessarily be the case. In this respect, at least, the current self's distributive relationship with its
contemporaries may differ from that which it enjoys with past and future selves (whether one's own, or
those of others).
172. See, e.g., Fennell & Stark, supra note 5, at 32; Shaviro, supra note 3, at 767.
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consumption into heaps and alternate them with periods of low consumption,
for example, then D's willpower problems would interfere less with that OACP
than would B's. Third, borrowing adds new wrinkles, both by opening up
additional vistas for self-control problems and by making it possible for people
to smooth consumption backwards. Yet the example helpfully emphasizes the
potential role of intrapersonal redistribution within an annual tax system. It
would be possible to do even more intrapersonal redistribution through the tax
system by employing mechanisms like age-based taxation, 173 or by simply
altering the timing of tax collection.1 7 4 1 Will consider below the possibility of
allowing people to opt into particular tax timing regimes based, among other
things, on their preferences for intrapersonal redistribution.17 5
B. INCOME TAXES AND CONSUMPTION TAXES
Closely allied conceptually to the question of the appropriate tax period is the
question of whether an income or a consumption tax should be used.176 If we
take the lessons of the life-cycle hypothesis to heart, an optimal tax system
would leave individuals free to arrange both labor and consumption in any
temporal pattern they choose. 1 77 Just as annual taxation can distort earning
patterns, taxing savings-which an income tax does, but a consumption tax, at
least in its "prepaid" form, does not-can distort consumption patterns.178 In
addition, the results are often deemed unfair to savers.917
173. See Polinsky, supra note 5, at 250; Fennell & Stark, supra note 5, at 47-49.
174. See, e.g., Polinsky, supra note 5, at 249 (discussing the possibility that households could defer
tax payments without changing their present value tax liability); Shaviro, supra note 3, at 761-62
(distinguishing annual tax liability from annual cash flow settlement); Fennell & Stark, supra note 5, at
58-63 (discussing the potential for altering collection protocols).
175. See infra section IV.B.3.
176. See Shaviro, supra note 3, at 748-49; see also Zelenak, supra note 70, at 333, 351-54.
177. See Shaviro, supra note 3, at 788 (noting the implications of the permanent-income hypothesis
for the choice of tax base as well as for the choice of tax period).
178. On this account, choices about when to consume are no different than choices between different
goods. See, e.g., Bankman & Weisbach, Superiority, supra note 3, at 1423-27 (analogizing the choice
to one between prunes and figs); Shaviro, supra note 3, at 765 (analyzing "earlier consumption" and
"later consumption" as two goods). Like any other tax that applies different rates to different
commodities, a tax on savings adds a distortion to the labor/leisure distortion that already exists. See
A.B. Atkinson & J.E. Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structure: Direct Versus Indirect Taxation, 6 J. Pua.
EcON. 55, 56 (1976); Bankman & Weisbach, Superiority, supra note 3, at 1414-19. The conclusion that
the results are unambiguously less efficient is based on the assumption that the new distortion to
consumption timing piles on top of, without in any way alleviating, the original labor/leisure distortion.
See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 3, at 783. This assumption is based, in turn, on the claim that a tax on
savings distorts labor just as much as a wage tax. See Bankman & Weisbach, Superiority, supra note 3,
at 1422 (asserting that a tax on income from savings "distorts work effort in exactly the same manner as
if the work had been taxed directly"). If people are myopic, this assumption might not hold true; the
deferred tax on savings would have less of an impact on labor than would the immediate wage tax. See,
e.g., Kaplow, supra note 5, at 2 (observing that "taxes on capital-or, equivalently, differential taxes on
future consumption-are ordinarily levied in the future, raising the possibility that they may have less of
an effect on the current labor supply of myopic individuals").
179. For a discussion of this argument and the sort of example used to make it, as well as a
counterargument, see Kelman, supra note 7, at 653-58.
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If we were to simply eliminate the tax on all savings without changing
anything else, the tax system would become less progressive, assuming people
with high labor incomes save more than people with low labor incomes. 180 But,
as proponents of the consumption tax have emphasized, the change could be
made distributively neutral by making the tax on labor income more progres-
sive, so that each wage class continues to bear the same relative burden as they
would under a system in which savings as well as earnings were taxed. 8' The
distributive effects would be different within wage classes than they are pres-
ently, but the system as a whole would not have to become less progressive
between wage classes. 18 2 If it were possible to undertake such a distributively
neutral shift,18 3 how would high- and low-willpower people, respectively, fare?
If we think that wage levels are positively correlated with willpower levels,
then a progressive rate structure would already (on average) deliver relief to
low-willpower groups. Not taxing savings would then reward (or at least not
punish) those relatively high-willpower individuals within low-willpower groups,
much like Roemer's notion of rewarding effort that is relatively high within a
given reference group. 18 4 Such an approach would have the attractive character-
istic of not deterring individuals from exerting willpower effort while at the
same time directing more resources (through the progressive rate structure) to
those in low-willpower groups. The argument depends, however, on the empiri-
cal assumption that willpower levels correlate with wage levels. There is some
evidence that impatience is inversely related to cognitive ability,185 which in
turn would be expected to correlate with wage income. While impatience is not
the same thing as low willpower, low willpower is one reason that impatient
180. In other words, savings might be characterized as a "luxury good" that is predominantly
available to the wealthy. See, e.g., Bankman & Weisbach, Superiority, supra note 3, at 1428;
Christopher D. Carroll, Why Do the Rich Save So Much?, in DOES ArLAs SHRUG? THE EcONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 465, 481 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000).
181. See, e.g., Bankman & Weisbach, Superiority, supra note 3, at 1428-30. Indeed, efficiency gains
from the system might be used to underwrite a more progressive tax system than the one we have
currently. See id.
182. See id. at 1439-40 (explaining that switching to a "replicating wage tax" from an income tax
"will redistribute from spenders to savers" within wage classes).
183. Maintaining distributive neutrality while eliminating a tax on savings would require placing a
higher tax rate on a narrower base, a move that might well prove politically impossible. Cognitive work
suggests that how a tax burden is presented and framed determines how it is evaluated. See, e.g.,
Jonathan Baron & Edward J. McCaffery, Masking Redistribution (or Its Absence), in BEHAVIORAL
PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 12, at 85, 88.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 134-37.
185. See Thomas Dohmen et al., Are Risk Aversion and Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability?
100 Am. EcON. REv. 1238, 1257 (2010) (finding, based on tests administered to a sample of over 1000
people age seventeen and older living in Germany, "that people with lower cognitive ability are ...
significantly more impatient" after "controlling for personal characteristics, educational attainment,
income, and liquidity constraints"). An earlier study of ninety-two Chilean high school students
generated similar results. See Daniel J. Benjamin et .al., Who Is "Behavioral"? Cognitive Ability and
Anomalous Preferences (May 5, 2006) (working paper), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 675264.
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behaviors may at times be observed.' 86 But there is also significant heterogene-
ity in savings behaviors within wage-income levels, which might at least be
suggestive of willpower heterogeneity.
Would wealth levels (at a given wage level and life stage) offer a better gauge
of willpower levels? Presumably, the relationship between wealth accumulation
and willpower is nonrandom, and there is some empirical evidence connecting
the two.187 The contours of the relationship are not entirely straightforward,
however. For one thing, self-control problems can manifest in both oversaving
and undersaving.'" Consumption-timing preferences (as distinct from will-
power) can explain some differentials in savings behavior, as can differences in
earning patterns and in inherited wealth. Nonetheless, the relative accumulation
of wealth at any given income level and life-cycle stage offers at least a weak
informational signal about willpower. However, this information might be taken
into account in ways other than an income tax on savings and investments.' 8 9
Thus far, I have been using as my model for the consumption tax what is
sometimes termed the "prepaid" version, which simply taxes labor income and
does not tax any savings or investment income. Operating on the premise that
earned income will be consumed sooner or later, such a tax collects upfront for
the consumption that will inevitably follow, without regard to when consump-
186. See supra text accompanying note 33 (defining willpower and distinguishing it from stable time
preferences). For another take on the connection between intelligence and self-control, see Posner,
supra note 33, at 28-29 (observing that "as imagination is a component of intelligence, a more
intelligent person will be more future-oriented than will a less intelligent one" but also noting a
countervailing factor-the intelligent person's ability to "develop rationalizations that may deceive the
future-oriented self").
187. See, e.g., Ameriks et al., supra note 25, at 968-69 (in a study involving the hypothetical
allocation of ten dinner certificates, finding that regression analysis "identifies a clear relationship
between self-control problems and wealth accumulation"); John Ameriks et al., Wealth Accumulation
and the Propensity To Plan, 118 Q.J. EcON. 1007, 1039 (2003) (finding a correlation between planning
behaviors and wealth accumulation based on survey and accounting data collected from TIAA-CREF
participants and positing that "effortful self-control" may be involved).
188. See, e.g., Ameriks et al., supra note 187; see also Rick et al., supra note 18, at 768 (discussing
"tightwads" whose "affective reaction to spending may lead them to spend less than their more
deliberative selves would prefer"). Not only may people oversave due to miserliness, they may also do
so as a result of excessive rule following prompted by their own propensities to undersave. See supra
text accompanying notes 85-87.
189. Bankman and Weisbach have noted that even if some marginal tax on savings were supported
by the "indicator good" argument, there is no particular reason to think that applying the same marginal
tax to savings as to labor income would be warranted. Bankman & Weisbach, Consumption, supra note
3, at 801; see also Deborah M. Weiss, Can Capital Tax Policy Be Fair? Stimulating Savings Through
Differentiated Tax Rates, 78 CORNELL L. RE. 206, 227-29 (discussing separate tax schedules for capital
and wage income, as well as the possibility of separate capital tax schedules applicable to different
wage groups). Another alternative would be a periodic wealth tax, which has sometimes been discussed
as a possible adjunct to a consumption tax. See, e.g., John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax,
Consumption-Type Income Tax Proposals in the United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental
Tax Reform, 88 CAUF. L. REv. 2095, 2182 (2000) (citing COMMISSION CHAIRED BY PROFESSOR J.E. MEADE,
INST. FOR FIscAL. STUDIEs, THE STRucruRE AND REFORM OF DIREcr TAXATION (1978)). In section IV.B.3, I




tion actually occurs. Another possibility is a "postpaid" consumption tax under
which tax liability for a given period is based on actual consumption within that
period. If a progressive, postpaid system were adopted, as Edward McCaffery
has advocated,' 90 it would have some interesting implications for willpower
analysis. McCaffery views savings used for consumption smoothing as legiti-
mately nontaxable, but advocates taxing savings that enable consumption above
this "smoothing" baseline. 1 9' He bases his normative case for this approach
primarily on its heavier taxation of those whose consumption horizons are
expanded by what is, to them, a windfall, as where one generation is able to
consume at a much higher level than their earnings would otherwise permit, due
to the savings and bequests of the prior generation. 192 But a postpaid, progres-
sive consumption tax system would have the additional effect of encouraging
people to smooth their own consumption through the life cycle-a feature that
McCaffery also views as attractive.19 3
Notice that in this regard a postpaid, progressive consumption tax would
present the flip side of the horizontal equity concerns that Vickrey raised about
annual taxation. Instead of taxing more heavily those who earn unevenly, as
annual taxation does, McCaffery's proposal would tax more heavily those who
spend unevenly. The progressive rate structure effectively penalizes consump-
tion that occurs in large lumps; the lower marginal rate applied to the valleys
between these lumps will not counterbalance the tax effects of these spending
spikes. Thus, the rate structure rewards smooth consumption (although McCaf-
fery proposes brackets wide enough that the smoothing need not be perfect to
reap those rewards).19 4 Because such a tax system favors one consumption
pattern over another, it would be expected to produce distortions in the direction
of that pattern. Of course, if one believes that the smooth consumption pattern is
normatively superior,'9 5 these shifts would be viewed not as distortions but
rather as desirable corrections.
Can we view the postpaid, progressive consumption tax as an example of
penalizing low willpower? Low-willpower people would be less able to con-
form their consumption to a specified pattern than would high-willpower people,
assuming that the two groups do not systematically vary with respect to how
closely their earning patterns already approximate it (or along other relevant
dimensions such as access to capital). The distributive results would be unattract-
ive to the extent that low-willpower people failed to achieve the requisite degree
190. Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REv. 807, 854-56 (2005).
191. Id. at 815-16.
192. Id. at 870-73.
193. Id. at 882-84.
194. Id. at 882-83.
195. McCaffery takes this view. See id. at 884 (arguing that "there are paternalistic reasons to try to
get individuals actually to smooth their consumption" and opining that "[i]t is prudent and good to live
.within one's means, to borrow sensibly in youth and to save responsibly in middle age"). However,
McCaffery emphasizes that his approach is driven primarily by administrative considerations, with the
effects on consumption smoothing representing a "fortuity." Id.
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of smoothing and suffered from higher tax burdens as a result. Would there be a
countervailing benefit for those members of the low-willpower population who
responded to the incentive and engaged in a greater degree of consumption
smoothing? Perhaps, but we would need to know more.
As I have emphasized already, 1 9 6 we do not know what the (pretax) OACP of
any particular person or group of people looks like, so it is difficult to infer
whether observed uneven consumption is a product of low willpower, mere
preferences, or other constraints. 19 7 If OACPs typically involve very smooth
consumption, then penalizing uneven consumption might encourage many people
to do a better job of achieving their OACPs. But when OACPs involve lumpy,
uneven consumption, penalizing that uneven consumption would introduce a
deadweight loss: people with lumpy OACPs who switched to a smooth pattern
would suffer diminished utility without delivering any revenue to the tax
system.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the approach embodied in McCaffery's
proposal is a familiar one: that of repricing certain kinds of consumption
choices that are thought to be harmful to society or to the people making them.
We see this same approach in a broad range of taxes and subsidies for activities
that are disfavored or favored on normative grounds.
C. SIN TAXES (OR VIRTUE SUBSIDIES)
Although we usually think that taxes work better the less they distort behav-
ior, some taxes (and subsidies) intentionally reprice behavior in the hope of
aligning it more closely with the social optimum.19 8 Pigouvian taxes are de-
signed to correct for externalities-costs that would not otherwise be taken into
account in the decision maker's calculus. 99 In a world of zero transaction costs,
the opportunities for bargaining would cause every cost to be taken into
196. See supra text accompanying note 152.
197. The tax system can be understood as one input into the calculation that determines an
individual's OACP, and heavily taxing uneven consumption could turn what would otherwise be a
lumpy-consumption OACP into an OACP featuring smooth consumption. But because we want to
examine whether some other consumption pattern would have delivered more lifetime utility in the
absence of the behavioral influence of the tax, we are interested in people's pretax OACPs in the
context of the present discussion.
198. See, e.g., Kyle D. Logue & Joel Slemrod, Of Coase, Calabresi, and Optimal Tax Liability, 63
TAX L. REv. 797, 829-30 (2010) (distinguishing Pigouvian taxes, which are designed to affect activity
levels, from revenue-raising taxes which seek to avoid doing so). My discussion focuses on corrective
taxes directed at intrapersonal dilemmas of self-control. A distinct question is how the design of taxes
targeting externalities (interpersonal dilemmas) addresses cognitive biases and time preferences. See,
e.g., Brian Galle & Manuel Utset, Is Cap-and-Trade Fair to the Poor? Shortsighted Households and
the Timing of Consumption Taxes, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 33, 63-82 (2010).
199. Pigou advocated taxes or subsidies to close the gap between the private and social payoffs of an
act. A.C. PiGou, THE EcONOMICS OF WELFARE 172-203 (4th ed. 1932). Thus, a Pigouvian tax charges an
actor an amount equal to the marginal cost of the external harm he inflicts. See, e.g., Maureen L.
Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J. ECON. LrrERATURE 675, 680
(1992) (defining Pigouvian taxes).
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account.200 In many real-world contexts, however, external costs are unlikely to
be internalized by the parties imposing them. The same principle can be applied
in the case of internalities, or costs that one temporal self imposes on other
selves.20 1
Translating Pigouvian taxes designed for externalities into the intrapersonal
context presents a problem, however: it will typically be much less clear that an
unaccounted for cost has actually been imposed on another party.202 The
question is not whether a given temporal self causes another self to suffer some
observable harm, but rather whether the acting self did so without taking into
account the impact on the later self. To know whether this is the case, we need
some idea of the transaction-cost environment surrounding the individual's
internal deliberations.20 3 One might reasonably argue that some individuals
approach a Coasean state in which different temporal selves frictionlessly
transact.204 This assumption is indeed implicit in the life-cycle model. People
who are consistently capable of making perfect intertemporal tradeoffs are no
doubt the exception, but many people do regularly take the effects on other
selves into account in their decision making. For example, someone may choose
to eat a bowl of ice cream fully recognizing and accepting the likely impact on
her weight and health.2 05 If the current self is already internalizing all the costs
200. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1, 2-8 (1960). For this reason, a cost
imposed on another party is not necessarily an externality. We must examine whether the actor took the
impacts in question into account, as by agreeing to pay for the costs or refusing a payment to cease.
See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 49 (7th ed. 2010).
201. See, e.g., R.J. Herrnstein et al., Utility Maximization and Melioration: Internalities in Indi-
vidual Choice, 6 J. BEHAV. DEcISION-MAKING 149, 150 (1993) (defining "'internality"' as "a within-
person externality"); Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes, 90 J. Pus. EcoN. 1825,
1827-30 (2006) (applying Pigouvian analysis to internalities). Willpower lapses are only one possible
source of internalities; selves may impose costs on other selves without even realizing that they are
doing so. See, e.g., Herrnstein et al., supra, at 154.
202. See WHYTMAN, supra note 66, at I (criticizing current versions of internality theory for
"ignor[ing] the possibility of within-person bargaining and other private solutions to self-control
problems").
203. On this question, and the difficulty of getting good information about it, see Ainslie, supra note
107, at 139, 166-70. See also WHrrtAN, supra note 66, at 6-13 (analyzing intrapersonal bargaining
opportunities and potential breakdowns in them).
204. On the other hand, the inability to enter into binding contracts with one's other selves arguably
makes the transaction cost environment less accommodating than in the interpersonal case. See
WHTmAN, supra note 66, at 9-10 (noti6g this and other differences between the transaction cost
problems faced by different selves and different people).
205. See id. at 11 (discussing an example in which the choice to eat a Twinkie is fully internalized).
To be sure, full internalization of this sort confronts some difficulties, including the fact that future
impacts tend to be less tangible, in part due to the uncertainty surrounding them. See Scott Rick &
George Loewenstein, Intangibility in Intertemporal Choice, 363 PumL. TRANSACrIONs RoYAL Soc'y B:
BIOLoGIcAL Sci. 3813 (2008). Delayed effects also frequently depend on interactions with other
decisions over time, making it less clear what the impact of any given choice will ultimately be. See,
e.g., Draien Prelec & R.J. Herrnstein, Preferences or Principles: Alternative Guidelines for Choice, in
STRATEGY AND CHOICE 319, 323 (Richard J. Zeckhauser ed., 1991) (describing "situations in which the
economically significant variables are aggregates of many temporally distinct decisions, each of which,
individually, has little impact").
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of the decision, a tax generates rather than corrects a distortion.2 06 A heavy tax
on ice cream might induce a shift to, say, chewing gum, producing a reduction
in the person's lifetime well-being and raising no revenue for the govern-
ment-a deadweight loss.
Some additional concerns about repricing conduct have already been raised
above.20 7 Not only may a tax fail to properly match the impacts of the conduct
in question, especially when nonlinearities are present,208 it also imposes espe-
cially heavy burdens on those with the lowest stocks of willpower by adding an
external penalty to the costs of willpower failure.20 9 If the tax is accurately set
to match the damage that the activity does to a future self, then those who
choose to pay and continue suffer twice as much harm as they would in the
absence of the tax.210 One way around this difficulty is to let the later self
receive the tax proceeds collected from the earlier self; the money will then
compensate her for her earlier self's bad decisions.2 11 If the actions of the
earlier self produce a risk of harm rather than a certainty, we might treat the tax
payments as insurance premiums that go toward treating the problems that the
later self may develop.2 12 At this point, we can reframe the policy intervention
as a forced purchase of insurance bundled with the good in question, or as a
withdrawal of a previously available choice (buying Good X on its own). The
idea of withdrawing choices outright is well represented among implemented
and proposed policies, as the next section explains.
D. FORCED AND FORBIDDEN INTERTEMPORAL CHOICES
Social Security offers a good example of a mandated intertemporal tradeoff,
and its interactions with myopic decision making have received significant
206. See, e.g., WHTMAN, supra note 66, at 11.
207. See supra section H.B.
208. See, e.g., Strnad, supra note 11, at 1244 (discussing complexities associated with nonlinear
impacts). To be sure, the same problem with nonlinearity exists when taxes attempt to correct for
externalities. However, measurement difficulties may be especially acute for internalities. See id.
209. See id. at 1254; cf. Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 104, at 183 (explaining that when
negative emotions associated with giving in to temptation fail to prevent the lapse, "people, in effect,
pay twice for their indulgences: they incur the material negative consequences that result, and they also
experience negative emotions as a result of their lapse"); id. at 190 (explaining that "interventions [that]
involve manipulating immediate emotions such as guilt and fear. . . run into exactly the same problems
as do the self-control strategies under discussion: when they don't succeed in altering behavior, they
merely impose additional costs on people") (emphasis omitted).
210. Strnad, supra note 11, at 1254. As noted above, it might actually be a "triple whammy" if
exercise costs are unsuccessfully incurred as well. See supra text accompanying note 157. Guilt and
other nonpecuniary penalties could raise the cost even higher. See Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra
note 104, at 183.
211. See Bhattacharya & Lakdawalla, supra note 10. This requires, of course, that the earlier self
actually bear the burden of the tax-which may not be the case if borrowing or savings are available.
See Whitman & Rizzo, supra note 39, at 428-29.
212. See Strnad, supra note II, at 1255.
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attention.2 13 Although forcing people to allocate money to later periods might
be justified on a number of grounds, including control of the externalities from
widespread poverty among the elderly, some of the advantages relate directly to
self-control. Placing hard constraints on choice sets offers a way around the
costs associated with low willpower. Not only does such an approach keep
people from making unfortunate intertemporal tradeoffs through a lapse of
willpower, it also avoids the less dramatic problem of people burning up limited
cognitive resources in refraining from such a lapse.214 Thus, Social Security
produces results that might resemble those brought about by willpower without
any exertion of self-control, saving people the costs of avoiding temptation.215
A variety of other policies similarly operate to foreclose particular choices or
to remove particular products from the market. Regulatory controls on prices 216
and on product attributes withdraw choices or buffer their negative effects.2 17
These restrictions could have the effect of allocating more surplus to the
consumer, or they might simply drive away suppliers in ways that remove
options from the consumer's choice set. Consider, for example, tighter limits on
mortgage lending. If regulatory limits placed certain kinds of loans out of reach,
people need not exert willpower to keep themselves from taking on that type of
debt; the price-product bundle is unavailable. As in the case of Social Security,
213. See Louis KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC EcONOMIcs 291-301 (2008); Diamond
& Koszegi, supra note 130; Feldstein, supra note 5; Ayge imrohoroglu et al., Time-Inconsistent
Preferences and Social Security, 118 Q.J. OF EcON. 745 (2003); Kumru & Thanopoulos, supra note 5;
Weiss, supra note 52, at 1298-99; Helmuth Cremer et al., Forced Saving, Redistribution, and
Nonlinear Social Security Schemes (CESifo, Working Paper No. 2325, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1145182; Kaplow, supra note 5. Social Security embodies just one possible design approach
to a mandatory retirement savings program. See Dan Ariely, Want People To Save? Force Them, DAN
ARIE.Y BLOG (Sept. 25, 2010), http://danariely.com/2010/09/25/want-people-to-save-force-them/ (discuss-
ing Chile's legally mandated retirement savings program, in which 11% of salary must be channeled to
a retirement account, but employees retain some choice as to the risk level).
214. The idea that exercising self-control is costly is often explicitly included in economic models of
intertemporal choice. See, e.g., Gul & Pesendorfer, supra note 110, at 1420 ("utility penalty" from the
exercise of self control); Shefrin & Thaler, supra note 57, at 612 ("psychic cost" of willpower);
Ozdenoren et al., supra note 101, at 4 (modeling the depletion effects of exercising willpower).
215. See Kumru & Thanopoulos, supra note 5, at 774-75 (noting the effects of Social Security in
reducing the costs of exercising willpower, as well as the possibility that it could reduce self-control
efforts among the young).
216. It is worth noting that limits on prices, such as interest rate caps on consumer loans, take
exactly the opposite approach of an intrapersonal Pigouvian tax. Rather than aiming to reduce the harm
caused by an activity by raising its price (and thus deterring participation), such reforms try to reduce
the harm caused by an activity by lowering its price, even though this move would also be expected to
increase demand. See Richard Posner, Have We Lost the Moral Values That Undergird a Commercial
Society?, BECKER-POSNER BLoG (June 15, 2008, 7:09 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2008/06/
have-we-lost-the-moral-values-that-undergird-a-comnercial-society--posner.htl (critiquing an argu-
ment by David Brooks in favor of increased lending by churches and foundations by observing that if
the loans are made available "at lower interest rates than payday loans, the former payday borrowers
will borrow more").
217. Bans on certain product attributes might also be recast as repricings. For example, tar and
nicotine levels might be regulated or alcohol content limited in an effort to protect consumers. Because
consumers can counter the restriction by consuming more of the product, a possible effect is simply to
raise the cost of consumption, as with a sin tax.
2011] 1413
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOuRNAL
this choice withdrawal has two potential benefits. First, it means that people will
not make certain kinds of borrowing choices. Second, it means that people will
not waste the cognitive energy that it takes to resist those borrowing choices.
These advantages come with some significant downsides, however. First, the
"energy savings" benefit might not prove advantageous over the long run, if
taking too many decisions away from individuals causes willpower to atrophy
over time.218 Given how little we know about the precise operation of will-
power, we cannot be sure whether the short-run conservation advantages of
avoiding the exertion of willpower will outstrip the long-run "strength training"
advantages of regularly making such exertions. Second, blocking decisions
impedes autonomy-including that of high-willpower people who do not want
or need to have the choice taken from them. Indeed, the blocked choice may be
an integral part of the OACPs of many people, and although blocking it off may
help certain low-willpower individuals achieve their OACPs, that gain comes at
the cost of thwarting the ability of high-willpower people to pursue their
OACPs.219
E. STICKY DEFAULTS
An in-kind form of repricing that tries to overcome the difficulties associated
with withdrawing choices outright is the notion of "nudging" through default
selections.22 0 In the realm of intertemporal choice, such nudges generally
amount to making the more patient or farsighted choice the default. The Obama
Administration has embraced this approach in the context of retirement plan-
ning,22 1 following research that shows how automatic participation in 401(k)
programs can keep procrastination from eroding the potential savings of employ-
ees. 22 2 Such default selections aspire to an "asymmetric paternalism" that helps
218. See supra section I.C.3 (discussing "erosion costs").
219. For a general critique of libertarian paternalism based on its tendency to burden more rational
individuals in order to provide benefits to those who are less rational, see Gregory Mitchell, Review
Essay, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1245, 1269-75 (2005).
220. See generally THALER & SuNsTEIN, supra note 158.
221. See Emily Brandon, 5 Ways Obamas Budget Will Impact Retirees, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Feb. 14, 2011, http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/planning-to-retire/2011/02/14/5-ways-obamas-
budget-will-impact-retirees (reporting that Obama's 2012 budget "proposes requiring employers that do
not currently offer a retirement plan to enroll their employees in a direct-deposit IRA account" unless
the employee opts out or the business qualifies for an exemption due to its small size). Additional
applications might include default selections designed to foster more annuitization. See Ron Lieber, The
Unloved Annuity Gets a Hug from Obama, N.Y. TimES, Jan. 30, 2010, at B 1 (referring to WILUAM G.
GAI ET AL., RET. SEC. PROJECT, INcREAsING ANNUrrIZATION IN 401(K) PLANs wrrH AuTomAnc TRIAL INCOME
(2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/06.annuities-gale/06
annuities-gale.pdf).
222. See, e.g., James J. Choi et al., Passive Decisions and Potent Defaults, in ANAIXsEs IN THE
ECONOMICS OF AGING 59 (David A. Wise ed., 2005) [hereinafter Choi et al., Passive Decisions]
(modeling impacts of 401(k) defaults); James J. Choi et al., For Better or for Worse: Default Effects
and 401(k) Savings Behavior, in PERsPEcnvEs IN THE EcONOMICS OF AGING 81, 83 (David A. Wise ed.,
2004) (finding in a study of three large firms "that automatic enrollment has a dramatic impact on
participation rates" leading to enrollments in excess of 85 percent, whereas previous enrollments at
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those who need it without imposing large costs on those who do not.223 While
advocates of such policies recognize that opting out does impose a cost, they
suggest that expenditures can be kept to a minimum, as with Thaler and
Sunstein's "'one-click' paternalism." 2 24 Moreover, in cases where it is impos-
sible to avoid having some default,225 there will inevitably be costs associated
with opting out.
The usual reason for advocating a small nudge (an easy opt-out procedure)
over a forceful shove (a more difficult procedure for opting out) is to avoid
imposing costs on those who rationally disprefer the default. But in deciding
how sticky to make a given default, we should worry not only about people who
rationally choose to opt out, but also about those who irrationally opt out. Like
a tax or subsidy, a default alters the relative prices of making a particular
choice, but the differential is collected in hassle and effort, rather than in
dollars. Just as people may make an undesirable temporal choice under a regime
in which those choices are taxed, people may opt out even when they should
not. An unheeded sin tax makes the "sinner" worse off than before (enduring
both the bad results of the habit and the tax); 2 2 6 similarly, an unheeded nudge
leaves the opter-out worse off than before (enduring both the hassle of opting
out and the bad results of the choice). However, in the sin-tax context the
money collected could, at least in theory, go toward easing the plight of the later
self (as by using cigarette tax revenues to fund the treatment of lung cancer).
The costs of opting out are simply lost.2 2 7
A default's impact is only partly a function of inertia; some of the default's
effects flow from conveying information or advice about what is best in the long
run.228 In this respect, the default choice resembles other efforts to educate
those firms "ranged from 26 to 43 percent after six months of tenure ... and from 57 to 69 percent after
three years of tenure").
223. See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case
for "Asymmetric Paternalism, " 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1211, 1212 (2003) ("A regulation is asymmetrically
paternalistic if it creates large benefits for those who make errors, while imposing little or no harm on
those who are fully rational."); see also Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Procrastination in
Preparing for Retirement, in BEHAVIORAL DIMENSIONS OF RETIREMENT EcONOMics 125, 150 (Henry J.
Aaron ed., 1999) (presenting the equivalent concept of "cautious paternalism").
224. THALER & SuNsTEIN, supra note 158, at 248-49.
225. To take one of Thaler and Sunstein's examples, cafeteria designers must put food in some order;
they might therefore consciously select an arrangement that encourages patrons to make healthier
selections. THALER & SuNsTEIN, supra note 158, at 1-6; see id. at 86 (noting the possibility that, in some
contexts, default selections can be avoided by requiring people to make a choice).
226. See Strnad, supra note 11, at 1254.
227. Cf Glaeser, supra note 157, at 135 (2006) (citing Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 104,
at 190) (observing that the "psychic tax" that soft paternalism imposes through stigmatizing certain
behaviors "provides no revenues").
228. See, e.g., THALER & SuNsTEIN, supra note 158, at 35, 83; Choi et al., Passive Decisions, supra
note 222, at 70 (discussing defaults as providing "implicit advice").
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decision makers.2 29 Such approaches are largely orthogonal to the question of
willpower (which assumes knowledge of a better long-term plan than the
current self wishes to undertake). 2 3 0 But educational efforts could produce a
culture in which certain kinds of consumption and savings patterns receive
higher levels of approval and status, and this could potentially influence the
development and deployment of willpower. More interestingly, some instru-
ments for imparting financial advice, such as financial planning software, might
also offer platforms from which precommitments could be undertaken.
IV. SELF-SORTING TowARD SELF-CONTROL
As the discussion to this point has suggested, informational burdens make
addressing willpower heterogeneity very difficult. In this last Part, I will
consider the potential to lower informational burdens by inducing self-selection.
After considering the government's potential role in offering precommiitment
devices, I will consider an approach that relies on self-sorting into tax and
regulatory regimes designed to be differentially attractive to high-willpower and
low-willpower populations.2 3 1
A. PRECOMMITMENT STRATEGIES
The potential role of preconnitment in managing self-control problems is
well known and has been thoroughly and interestingly discussed in the litera-
ture.2 32 Given the way I have defined willpower shortfalls here (as distinct from
persistent time preferences or unexpected and unregretted preference reversals),
precommitment will nearly always be at least a theoretical possibility. Precom-
mitment avoids two primary problems that generally accompany societal at-
tempts to address self-control issues. First, because precomnmitment is always
self-imposed, autonomy concerns are lessened. They are not, however, elimi-
nated-we still must decide when a particular self is entitled to make decisions
that are binding on other selves, and under what conditions those later selves
229. For example, financial-literacy education has recently attracted a great deal of attention. For a
skeptical view of this approach, see Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IowA L.
REv. 197 (2008).
230. See id. at 239-40 (distinguishing self-control efforts from education).
231. Again, the binary categories of high and low willpower do not capture the full range of
heterogeneity among taxpayers; a finer grained degree of self-sorting might be facilitated through more
complex menus. For purposes of illustrating the basic approach, however, two categories suffice.
232. See, e.g., AINsuE, supra note 85, at 125-44; BARON, supra note 16, at 480-81; JON ELSTER,
ULYSSES UNBouND 29-34 (2000); Thomas C. Schelling, Ethics, Law, and the Exercise of Self-Command,
in CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 83, 84 (1984); Thomas C. Schelling, The Intimate Contest for Self-
Command, Pus. INT., Summer 1980, at 94. An unmet demand for commitment features prominently in
many economic models of self-control problems. See, e.g., imrohoroglu et al., supra note 213; Kaplow,
supra note 5, at 4-5; Laibson, supra note 25. For recent experimental work on the demand for
precommitment, see Daniel Houser et al., Temptation and Commitment in the Laboratory (Institute for
Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich Working Paper No. 488, 2010), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1615379.
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can undo things. 2 3 3 Second, precommitment relies on the self-identification of
those with low willpower and hence avoids problems of overbroad application
of a policy that bans or reprices particular alternatives. Precommitment can also
be tailored in a variety of ways, either to foreclose future choices or to price
them.
A threshold question for tax policy is whether governmental precommitment
mechanisms are necessary. Some private precommitment devices exist, of
course. People can avail themselves of self-exclusion policies offered by casi-
nos,2 3 4 use financial products that embed illiquidity or constrain consump-
tion,235 pour their money into relatively illiquid repositories like houses,2 36
make purchase decisions in ways that intentionally ration access to "vice"
goods,23 7 and even enter into agreements to forfeit money if they break their
promises. to themselves.2 3 8 With few exceptions, however, such devices are
vulnerable to unraveling through additional private transactions.239 For ex-
ample, a person might lock up resources to render them inaccessible until a
future date, but their future availability would then provide a basis upon which
some other private entity would extend credit.240
233. See supra text accompanying notes 6649.
234. See, e.g., TIM HARFORD, THE LOGIC OF LIFE: THE RArIONAL ECONOMICS OF AN IRRATIONAL WORLD
61 (2008) (discussing self-exclusion policy offered by Harrah's casinos); Responsible Gaming, CAE-
SAR's ENTERTAINMENT, http://www.caesars.com/corporate/about-us-responsible-gaming.html (last visited
Mar. 21, 2011).
235. See, e.g., AYREs, supra note 149, at 169 (noting popularity of a liquidity-constrained bank
account introduced by a rural Mindanao bank in the Philippines); Amanda Swift King & John T. King,
Golden Eggs Versus Plastic Eggs: Hyperbolic Preferences and the Persistence of Debit, 35 J. EcON.
FIN. 93 (2011) (observing that consumers may use debit cards as precommitment devices). There has
also been significant recent interest in credit cards that allow consumers to set spending limits. See Ron
Lieber, Your Card Has Been Declined, Just as You Wanted, N.Y TIMEs, Aug. 14, 2010, at B 1; Press
Release, MasterCard Worldwide, Citi to Implement MasterCard inControl (Aug. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.mastercard.com/us/company/en/newsroom/prciti to implement mc_inControl.html; see also
DAN ARIELY, PREDICIABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OuR DECISIONS 124-26 (2008)
(recounting efforts to generate bank interest in such devices); Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of
Credit-Card Use and Preference AmongLow-Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REv. 451, 478-80 (2008)
(discussing potential for "self-directed credit cards").
236. See Laibson, supra note 35, at 446-51.
237. An interesting example of this approach is the choice to purchase smaller packages of a vice
good, which requires giving up volume discounts. See Klaus Wertenbroch, Consumption Self-Control
by Rationing Purchase Quantities of Virtue and Vice, 17 MARKETING SCI. 317, 325-26 (1998).
238. See, e.g., Michael B. Abramowicz & Ian Ayres, Compensating Commitments: The Law and
Economics of Commitment Bonds That Compensate for the Possibility of Forfeiture, 100 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming Mar. 2012) (manuscript at 7-17) (on file with The Georgetown Law Journal) (offering
"commitment contracts" under which individuals can choose to stake money that will go to others
(including disliked charities) if the commitment is broken); see generally Bryan et al., supra note 33.
239. See, e.g., Laibson, supra note 25, at 27 (explaining that private interventions designed to
implement desired savings plans "are vulnerable to third party arbitrage").
240. See id. at 27; Chen & Schwartz, supra note 63, at 28-29 (explaining that in the absence of
governmentally imposed limits "an agent may defeat the purpose of an illiquid savings vehicle by
issuing long term debt against it"); see also Gruber & Koszegi, supra note 28, at 1286 (observing that if
one company offered a precommitment drug that caused pain whenever the person taking it smoked,
another company would have an incentive to devise an antidote that would stop the pain); Laibson,
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Tax policy already incorporates some precommitment opportunities. Con-
sider, for example, the treatment of early withdrawals from LRAs or 401(k)s, 241
or the withholding system's accommodation of excessive advance tax pay-
ments.24 2 But there is room for much more innovation in the governmental
provision of precomnitment products.24 3 Setting up such mechanisms would
entail administrative costs that might be viewed as a form of in-kind redistribu-
tion to low-willpower types.244 However, these transfers would avoid the
identification and incentive problems of other compensatory schemes. If retain-
ing the option value of changing one's mind later is more valuable to those with
high willpower, then the net benefit of such a device would be greater for those
with self-control problems. Just as providing assistive devices in kind to people
with disabilities can make those individuals better off without attracting "mim-
ickers,"245 a precommitment product that is valuable to low-willpower people
but valueless to high-willpower people would make targeted assistance to the
former group self-enforcing. Here, the good provided in kind operates both as a
screening mechanism and as a benefit bestowed selectively on the screened.
group.
Precommitment can only reach true self-control problems-where a person
knows the best course of action and wishes to bind herself to take it. It is no
good as a remedy for time preferences that society wishes people did not have,
nor does it help the individual who lacks insight into the best course of action.
Moreover, if the precommiting self is not acting in the composite interests of the
self over time, precomnmitment can generate error costs.246 An additional under-
supra note 35, at 461 (explaining how instantly available credit makes illiquid goods lile houses less
effective as precommitment devices). Legal interventions might take the form of limiting unraveling of
precommitment devices rather than direct governmental provision of them. See Laibson, supra note 25,
at 27 (noting the potential for outlawing the arbitrage opportunities that threaten to unravel private
precommitments).
241. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 52, at 1313-14; see also Chen & Schwartz, supra note 63, at 4, 13
& n.21, 28-29 (discussing governmental limits on accessing IRAs).
242. A large majority of U.S. taxpayers engage in overwithholding or make excessive interim tax
payments; similarly, most recipients of the Earned Income Tax Credit fail to take advantage of the
advance payment option. See, e.g., Damon Jones, Inertia and Overwithholding: Explaining the Preva-
lence of Income Tax Refunds 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15963, 2010).
Although precommitment is far from the only possible explanation for these behaviors, it may well play
a role. For an overview of the literature on this question, see, for example, Fennell, supra note 17, at
148-52. See also Jones, supra (presenting evidence on the role of inertia in explaining overwithholding
behaviors). I thank Ian Benshalom for comments on this issue.
243. See, e.g., Chen & Schwartz, supra note 63, at 4 (proposing state provision of "both partly and
totally illiquid savings vehicles"). On the role of public policy more generally in providing "access to
scaffolding" for overcoming problems of self-control, see Joseph Heath & Joel Anderson, Procrastina-
tion and the Extended Will, in THE THIEF OF TIME: PHILOsOPHIcAL EssAYs ON PROCRASTINATION, supra note
70, at 233, 251-52.
244. See Mitchell, supra note 219, at 1272-75.
245. See Weisbach, supra note 55, at 87-89.
246. For example, a projection bias could cause an earlier self to commit to a course of action that
would turn out to be a mistake. Botond K6szegi and Matthew Rabin give the example of a woman who
plans to deliver her child without anesthesia, but then requests anesthetics while in labor. Botond
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breadth problem could result if people do not fully appreciate the future
self-control problems they will encounter. Here, the problem is not that people
are unaware of their optimal available consumption plans (OACPs)247 or how to
achieve them; they simply underestimate the difficulty of exerting willpower at
the crucial moment of decision.2 48 Hence, they might fail to engage in precom-
mitment even when it would generate significant gains. Although this lack of
self-awareness might seem like a daunting problem, there may be ways to
surmount it.
One approach would be to make precommitment mandatory without placing
any limits on the content of the choice. David Laibson's "Advance Notification
Game," which would require "that consumers choose their consumption level
one-period before the consumption actually takes place" represents an interest-
ing elaboration of this idea.2 4 9 As long as the deciding self's interests are
aligned with the individual's composite preferences, mandatory predecision
approaches could help close the utility gap that self-control problems intro-
duce.2 50 On the other hand, the requirement to decide in advance deprives
people of the opportunity to adjust their consumption plans in light of newly
learned information.25 1 While the tradeoff may be worth it for people with
self-control problems,25 2 it could impose a net cost on those with high will-
power.
Another strategy is to offer choices that operate as precommitments for
Koszegi & Matthew Rabin, Revealed Mistakes and Revealed Preferences, in THE FOUNDArlONS OF
PosrlvE AND NoRMAivE EcONOMICS 193, 206-07 (Andrew Caplin & Andrew Schotter eds., 2008). This
preference reversal could either represent a failure of willpower or a response to an earlier inability to
predict pain levels; if the latter, enforcing the woman's initial preference would reduce her well-being.
See id.
247. See supra section I.B.2.
248. See O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 33, at 109-12 (examining effects of naivet6 about
self-control problems); O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 19, at 219-38 (analyzing the effects of partial
recognition of willpower problems).
249. Laibson, supra note 25, at 21-22. As Laibson explains, the idea "would work like a bank
account that requires advance notification for withdrawals." Id. at 21. In another article, Laibson shows
how illiquid goods such as houses might implement such a game, if turning these goods into currency
requires time and effort. Laibson, supra note 35, at 446-51. Easy availability of credit to borrow against
those goods undoes these gains, however. Id. at 461-67.
250. See Laibson, supra note 25, at 21-22.
251. Put a different way, option value is lost when decisions must be made early. All approaches that
rely on precommitment have the drawback of reducing future flexibility. See Laibson, supra note 64, at
467 (noting that "being able to consume in unforeseen emergencies" might offset the losses that
liquidity imposes on those who would like to commit not to consume); Chen & Schwartz, supra note
63, at 19-20 (discussing flexibility and commitment in the context of choices to invest in partly or
completely illiquid instruments); Manuel Amador et al., Commitment vs. Flexibility, 74 ECONOMETRICA
365 (2006) (modeling tradeoffs between flexibility and commitment for individuals with self-control
problems).
252. For example, Laibson concludes based on his model that "[a]ll selves would be willing to pay
9/10 of one year's income ... to induce the government to implement one of the proposed savings
schemes." Laibson, supra note 25, at 30; see also Houser, supra note 232 (examining the price.
elasticity of demand for precommitment).
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sophisticates, but that also attract naifs for independent reasons.2 53 For example,
O'Donoghue and Rabin explain how an opt-in tax and subsidy system for
making an unhealthy food (potato chips) more expensive and a healthy food
(carrots) less expensive would attract not only sophisticates who wish to
precommit to the repricing scheme, but also health-conscious but willpower-
challenged naifs.2 54 The naifs assume they will want to eat only carrots in the
future and elect the scheme simply because it makes their preferred consump-
tion cheaper, yet when temptation arises, the scheme assists them in sticking to
their plans.2 55 This line of analysis suggests that government could take the idea
of precommitment a step further by consciously devising menu options for
individuals to select among.
B. SELF-SORTING INTO DIFFERENT TAX REGIMES
The idea of allowing people to opt into different tax or regulatory regimes is
not new. Indeed, the tax code already permits certain forms of self-classifica-
tion.2 5 6 Self-selection has also received recent theoretical attention as a way of
improving the targeting of a variety of social policies,2 57 including those
specifically addressing self-control issues.25 8 Rather than have policymakers
253. See O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10 (tax and subsidy schemes that encourage the
consumption of healthy food); Chen & Schwartz, supra note 63, at 4-5 (illiquid savings instruments
that attract sophisticates for the precommitment and naifs for the higher interest rate). Naifs are also
unaware of the risk that their future selves will undermine a given savings plan; their resulting tendency
to "overestimate the efficacy of savings" could offset their underestimation of the need to save in the
first place. Chen & Schwartz, supra note 63, at 5; see also O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 33, at 119
(explaining that even though "sophistication helps you when knowing about future misbehavior
increases your perceived cost of current misbehavior ... . [slophistication hurts you when knowing
about future misbehavior decreases your perceived cost of current misbehavior"). Another intriguing
approach to naivet6 would actually leverage the time biases of naifs to encourage precommitment.
Recent work has argued, for example, that allowing people to auction off the right to receive a set
amount of money if they fail to meet self-set goals could attract hyperbolic discounters by making a
lump of cash available upfront for taking on the challenge. See AYRES, supra note 149, at 60;
Abramowicz & Ayres, supra note 238, at 13-15.
254. O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10, at 189-90.
255. Id. Note that the election between tax regimes in this context is just a weaker form of requiring
advance notification of consumption. In effect, one chooses a consumption plan that one can later
escape by paying a higher price. O'Donoghue and Rabin also discuss a more explicit version of this
preplanning notion-nonrefundable coupons for purchasing certain goods. Id. at 190.
256. See, e.g., Heather M. Field, Choosing Tax: Explicit Elections as an Element of Design in the
Federal Income Tax System, 47 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 21 (2010); Erzo F.P. Luttmer & Richard J.
Zeckhauser, Schedule Selection by Agents: From Price Plans to Tax Tables 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 13808, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl3808.
257. See Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice To Target Tax Enforcement,
109 COLUM. L. REv. 689 (2009) (suggesting that tax enforcement could be targeted more effectively by
offering taxpayers a choice between two enforcement regimes that would be differentially attractive to
differently motivated taxpayers); Weisbach, supra note 55, at 93-99 (discussing use of differentially
attractive packages to redistribute toward people with disabilities); Luttmer & Zeckhauser, supra note
256, at 17-25 (modeling and estimating the gains that might be achievable with income tax schedule
selection).
258. E.g., O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10, at 189-90 (discussing the potential for sorting into
"type-specific optimal tax schemes"); Susanna Estaban, & Eiichi Miyagawa, Optimal Menu of Menus
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categorize people based on some observable characteristic,25 9 people categorize
themselves. Such self-sorting can harness private information and partition the
population in ways that facilitate tailored treatment of the subgroups. 2 6 0 Will-
power offers a paradigm case in which self-selection is feasible. By definition,
willpower deficits involve a level of self-awareness about the best available plan
coupled with an incapacity to carry it out. People in this position will uniquely
value policy instruments that can bring outcomes into line with their prefer-
ences.
For such self-sorting to generate benefits, however, it is necessary that the
alternatives not only be differentially attractive to groups of people who vary
along a dimension relevant to policy, but also capable of delivering better-
tailored policy treatments to each of those groups. Thus, as Alex Raskolnikov
has explained in another tax context, the alternatives must be designed to
accomplish two goals: effectively separating the population into groups for
purposes of differential treatment ("separating") and actually applying appropri-
ately different treatment to the groups ("targeting"). 2 6 1 Not every feature of the
respective bundles needs to serve both objectives.2 62 For example, some aspects
of a given package might be included to repel people with particular characteris-
tics without delivering any special benefits to those who are not repelled.26 3
Similarly, a feature that would be attractive to both groups can be included in
one of the bundles, as long as it is mixed with enough other differentially
attractive elements that sort the population. Nonetheless, both goals must be
kept in mind in composing the alternatives.2 6
Could we devise tax and regulatory packages that would harness private
information about willpower levels, split the taxpaying population along will-
power lines, and deliver appropriate treatment to those with lower willpower
levels? Posing the question in this way reopens the issue of what constitutes
"appropriate treatment," bringing us back to the three basic strategies discussed
earlier-compensation, repricing, and choice removal. Although these strategies
with Self-Control Preferences (Columbia Univ. Dep't of Econ,, Discussion Paper No. 0405-11, 2004),
available at http://digitalcommons.libraries.columbia.edu/econ.dp/54 (modeling how sellers might gain
from offering consumers multiple menus to select among, where some consumers have self-control
problems and would prefer a menu with fewer choices).
259. George A. Akerlof, The Economics of "Tagging" as Applied to the Optimal Income Tax,
Welfare Programs, and Manpower Planning, 68 Am. EcON. REv. 8, 8 (1978) (explaining how character-
istics that correlate with underlying differences such as poverty can be used to "tag" individuals for
different tax rates or other policy treatments).
260. See, e.g., id. at 16-17 (noting how a work training program may tag currently unskilled
individuals through a combination of eligibility requirements and self-selection, and thereby facilitate a
more tailored delivery of assistance).
261. Raskolnikov, supra note 257, at 739-40 (distinguishing "separating" from "targeting").
262. See id.
263. See, e.g., Estaban & Miyagawa, supra note 258, at 3 (explaining that sellers might "decorate"
one menu with tempting items that would be irrelevant for one consumer group but aversive to another
group with particular self-control problems).
264. See Raskolnikov, supra note 257, at 740 n.206 (counseling caution in adding features that
pursue one goal at the expense of the other).
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are not equally easy to implement through self-selection, each could be pursued
in some fashion using tax menus. Subsections 1 and 2 below examine self-
selected sin taxes and intrapersonal redistribution choices, which would imple-
ment repricing and choice removal strategies, respectively. Subsection 3 takes
on the more challenging task of pursuing a compensation strategy through
willpower-sensitive tax menus.
1. Selecting Sin Taxes
One straightforward way of selectively delivering precommitment opportuni-
ties through the tax system would be to simply allow people to choose among
tax levels in certain contexts. For example, Jay Bhattacharya and Darius
Lakdawalla have suggested that smokers could voluntarily purchase "smoking
licenses" that would commit their future selves to cigarette taxes. 2 6 5 Many
variations on this theme might be devised, from the self-selected tax and
subsidy scheme for food choices discussed above2 6 6 to choose-your-own-sin-tax
approaches that allow people to set their own tax levels for particular vices.2 67
Moreover, although traditional "vices" provide obvious candidates for self-
selected taxes, people might be given opportunities to reprice other sorts of
saving and spending behaviors as well. The present tax code already lets people
opt into precommitments with respect to retirement funds, 2 6 8 and innovative
extensions of this idea could give people more control over the prices of
particular consumption choices.
More unconventional regulatory choices might also be offered. Consider, for
example, another O'Donoghue and Rabin idea: in order to purchase cigarettes,
people would be required to obtain a special photo. ID that would cost $5,000
and would entitle its bearer to 2,500 tax-free packages of cigarettes.2 69 Only
those who planned to smoke a great deal would get their money's worth out of
the license, and hence it would be expected to attract those who had rationally
decided to pursue a cigarette addiction, 2 7 0 but not those who planned to smoke
only a little and then quit.2 71 If we assume that many of those in the latter
category would experience unforeseen willpower problems that would cause
them to experience utility-diminishing addictions, then the expensive license
would provide a valuable deterrent without getting in the way of any rationally
265. Bhattacharya & Lakdawalla, supra note 10, at 15-19.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 253-54.
267. See Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HAv. L. REV. 1399, 1482-85 (2005) (presenting
a variation on Bhattacharya & Lakdawalla, supra note 10, that would allow smokers to choose their
own tax level and create options for their later selves to exercise).
268. See supra text accompanying note 241.
269. O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10, at 190. The authors add that "[i]f there were concerns
that this scheme would prevent optimal experimentation, we could also issue a one-time 'learner's
permit' allowing a person to purchase up to 10 packs of cigarettes." Id.
270. See generally Becker & Murphy, supra note 28.
271. In this context as in others, lawbreaking (here, obtaining cigarettes through illegal channels
without a license) would undermine the desired results.
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planned addiction.2 72 This very interesting repricing strategy makes cigarettes
appear artificially expensive on a per-pack basis, given the unrealistically low
expectations that low-willpower people would have about their future smoking
plans.
Self-selected repricing strategies like these can enable people to fine-tune
their own incentive structures. To the extent these systems of rewards and
penalties foster OACP-compatible decisions by controlling internalities, they
can usefully advance well-being. But repricing strategies can be tricky, for the
reasons already noted: if the higher prices do not produce the desired behavioral
result, individuals may end up bearing the costs of the penalty as well as the
costs of the unwanted behavior, along with exercise costs associated with failed
attempts at resistance. Thus, even self-selected sin taxes introduced into a tax
system that raises revenue for public goods may produce redistribution from
low-willpower to high-willpower people. On the other hand, such repricing may
prompt regular exertions of willpower that help to strengthen resolve, dodging
the erosion costs that other approaches might present.
2. Choosing Patterns of Intrapersonal Redistribution
Instead of selecting taxes on particular activities, people might instead choose
among different life-cycle patterns of tax burdens and benefits. A number of tax
provisions already implicitly or explicitly allow taxpayers to choose when tax
payments will be made,273 and the potential for further choice along these lines
has been noted.27 4 Here, it becomes important to take cognizance of the
intrapersonal redistribution that is already built into a progressive annual taxa-
tion system.275 This redistribution from the high-earning selves to the low-
earning selves is likely to be more attractive to those who are less able to
rearrange money within the life cycle, whereas those who are good at spreading
their consumption optimally would prefer lifetime averaging.27 6
As a first cut, then, we might imagine policymakers allowing taxpayers to
present themselves either as separate annual temporal entities with respect to
272. See O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10, at 190.
273. For example, taxpayers can prepay (or overpay) taxes through the withholding and estimated
tax systems, can choose between a currently taxable Roth IRA and a tax-deferred traditional IRA, and
can decide when to sell assets and realize a gain or loss.
274. See, e.g., Polinsky, supra note 5, at 249 (discussing a plan in which households could choose to
defer a portion of their tax payments); Lee Anne Fennell, Death, Taxes, and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REv.
567, 649-52 (2003) (discussing estate tax prepayment); Jerry Gleeson, Congress Mulls "Prepaid"
Estate Tax, REGISTERED RFP., May 14, 2010, http://registeredrep.com/wealthmanagementlestateplan/
congress-mulls-prepaid estatetax_0514/.
275. See, eg., Polinsky, supra note 5, at 230.
276. This preference is sensitive to the collection method in place. See Liebman, supra note 4, at
31-50 (analyzing the impact of averaging on taxpayers with different earning patterns); see also
Shaviro, supra note 3, at 762-63 (discussing Vickrey's criterion regarding the relationship between the
tax due in a given period and the income in the prior period under lifetime averaging and noting its
"poor intellectual fit" with the system's assumption that taxes should not be sensitive to earning
patterns).
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tax burdens and distributive considerations or as fully integrated lifetime enti-
ties for whom burdens and benefits should be calculated on a life-cycle basis.
But because factors other than willpower shortfalls can impede the movement
of money within the life cycle, these choices would not line up systematically
with willpower levels. High-willpower people who lack liquidity would be
extremely interested in intrapersonal redistribution that moves money earlier in
the life cycle but quite disinterested in intrapersonal redistribution that moves
money later in the life cycle. Conversely, low-willpower people (in their
composite reflective states) would not want any redistribution that expands their
early-life consumption opportunities beyond their OACP. However, they would
be quite interested in redistribution to those spots in the life cycle that they
would, left to their own devices, have a tendency to leave depleted.
Although hyperopic low-willpower people present a complication, we might
generalize and say that forward (later in time) intrapersonal redistribution will
typically be more attractive to those who know they have low willpower and
wish to precommit, whereas backwards (earlier in time) intrapersonal redistribu-
tion will be more attractive to those with high willpower. Tools like age-specific
taxation or flexible tax payment options can increase or decrease the amount of
intrapersonal redistribution that occurs in either direction.2 77 Enabling people to
alter their choice sets by making funds less accessible during certain portions of
the life cycle amounts to a choice-removal strategy and one that might provide
well-being benefits to low-willpower people. This result depends on choices
being self-constrained in a manner consistent with the individual's OACP,
however.2 7 8 Further, to the extent that choice-removal mechanisms reduce the
need for self-directed patterns of savings, erosion costs could rise.
In addition, there are many considerations unrelated to willpower that would
cabin the degree to which a choice-based approach to lifetime benefits and
burdens could be implemented. For example, we would not want to allow even
the highest willpower individual to take all of her expected Social Security
benefits in early adulthood, given both the moral hazard concerns regarding
future taxpaying and the externalities associated with unalleviated poverty late
in life. Nonetheless, offering some degree of choice about the extent and
direction of the flow could prove useful for both high-willpower and low-
willpower individuals.
3. Targeting Low Willpower with Tax Menus
The alternatives discussed thus far roll together the functions of separation
and targeting-the targeted treatment applied to the separated groups is the very
277. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
278. Although errors in this regard deserve attention, it should also be noted that willpower failures
themselves often remove choices in a manner that is inconsistent with an individual's OACP (as where
spending decisions make a future quality of life unattainable).
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thing that makes the separation effective.2 79 Suppose, however, that we wished
to further address the utility gap between high-willpower and low-willpower
people through a compensatory tax strategy.280 Redistribution from low-
willpower people to high-willpower people cannot proceed on such a self-
separating basis; because everyone likes receiving redistributive payments,
redistribution (the targeted treatment) cannot itself serve as a separating mecha-
nism. If we wanted to include such redistribution, we would need to devise
packages that are capable of performing the separating work in a manner robust
enough to withstand the introduction of a universally valued element into one of
the packages. In other words, we have to insert something into the low-
willpower bundle that is more aversive to high-willpower people than the added
money is attractive without making it so aversive as to drive off low-willpower
individuals.
To fix ideas, consider two tax packages, both of which would begin with a
progressive wage tax that bases ultimate tax burdens on an entire lifetime of
earnings. In both packages, tax collections and the payment of benefits would
be arranged so as to consciously carry out a fair measure of intrapersonal
redistribution. This redistributive element would be timed differently under the
two packages, however. In Package One, intrapersonal redistribution would
operate primarily to move money to earlier points in the life cycle. This feature
would be especially attractive for liquidity-constrained people who have a high
degree of willpower, because it would relax an outside constraint that impedes
optimization. Package Two would skew intrapersonal redistribution in the
opposite direction; it would be expected to attract lower willpower people who
desire assistance in moving money later in the life cycle.
In addition, each package would offer some additional provisions that we
might expect high- and low-willpower people to find differentially attractive.
Package One taxpayers would be granted flexible tax repayment terms that
would permit them to shift payment for some of their lifetime tax burden into
their later years, which would further help to relieve liquidity constraints. 2 8 1
Package Two taxpayers might also find the flexibility attractive in theory, but
their self-control problems would make deferring a tax burden dangerous for
them. Instead, Package Two taxpayers would be subject to customized borrow-
ing and spending restrictions 28 2 as well as carefully scheduled tax payments.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 261-64.
280. What follows is an analytic investigation into this possibility, not a normative endorsement of
such a compensatory approach. Before rejecting this form of redistribution, however, the implicit
redistributive effects of alternative approaches should be examined. See Mitchell, supra note 219, at
1269-75 (critiquing the redistributive element embedded in libertarian paternalism). Some seemingly
neutral policies, such as those that withdraw choices across the board, could have the effect of
burdening high-willpower people in order to benefit low-willpower people. See supra note 219 and
accompanying text.
281. See, e.g., Polinsky, supra note 5, at 249.
282. While it would be possible to permit taxpayers some degree of choice as to how these limits
would work, and customization to account for health, wealth, family, and lifestage factors could be
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Table 3: Two Packages
Package One Package Two
Intrapersonal Skews Earlier Skews Later
Redistribution
Other Provisions Flexible Tax Payment Customized Borrowing and
Terms Spending Restrictions
Tax Rates Higher Lower
These restrictions should be attractive to low-willpower individuals as a form of
precommitment that helps to advance their OACPs, but high-willpower individu-
als would likely view the limits as aversive intrusions, given their ability to
achieve their OACPs on their own.
If the features just described were effective enough in separating the two
populations, it might be possible to add some modest measure of redistribution
to the treatment mix, as indicated in the third row of Table 3. Before discussing
the extent to which this might be possible, it is worth considering how this
added element would fit together with the other parts of the plan to influence
willpower-related costs. The first two rows of Package Two represent choice-
removal strategies that we might expect to reduce both failure costs and
exercise costs in the domains to which they apply. We would generally expect a
compensatory approach to reduce the costs of failure but increase the incidence
of failure (even while reducing exercise costs) by rendering failure less costly.
Yet, it is important to recognize the extent to which that result is dependent on
the willpower failures themselves constituting the basis upon which compensa-
tory payments are made. If, instead, it were possible to identify low-willpower
people based on their election of choice-limiting products and services that hold
uniquely positive value to them (that is, the items in the first two rows of
Package Two), directing resources to such individuals would not carry the same
moral hazard. Instead, a low-willpower person who receives compensatory
payments based on these other separating criteria would still do best by minimiz-
ing failures in those domains in which her choice has not been self-restricted.
Although she would exert effort in the process, these exercise costs could also
prove functional in combating the erosion costs that might accompany a more
thoroughgoing restriction of choice.
Obviously, a primary concern with a "choose-your-tax-regime" plan is that
readily incorporated, it is probably unrealistic to suppose that taxpayers could enlist the government's
help in following any consumption pattern they happen to prefer. A particular concern is whether the
program could offer any help to the hyperopic oversaver. It would be theoretically possible to let such a
person precommit to a "sensible" spending plan that capped the amount of savings as well as the
amount of spending in each period, but it is unclear whether support for such an approach would exist.
Despite some excellent theoretical work on the topic, concerns about hyperopia have received very
little attention in the policy realm.
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people will attempt to obtain more favorable treatment than the plan's design
intends to give them. Thus, it is possible that some people without self-control
problems would accept Package Two's aversive and unnecessary (for them)
restrictions on borrowing and consumption in order to get the lower tax rate.
Not only would this produce redistribution in the wrong direction, it would also
involve deadweight loss (the unwanted restrictions).2 8 3 The opposite classifica-
tion problem could also result: those who are naive about their severe self-
control problems might elect Package One in order to avoid restrictions on their
borrowing and consumption and end up much worse off-more heavily taxed
and yet unable to actually move money optimally within the life cycle. Both
possibilities raise the question of whether some limits could or should be placed
on the choice of plan.
- There are a variety of possibilities in this regard. The softest approach would
be simply to have a different default package apply depending on wealth or
savings levels (relative to others in one's income band and life cycle stage) and
allow people to opt out if they chose. Other alternatives would make informa-
tion about wealth accumulation give rise to presumptions of varying strengths
about the appropriate classification; those presumptions might be rebutted with
sufficient evidence of saving and spending patterns. But such a presumption-
based approach undercuts the notion of self-selection, imposes new informa-
tional and administrative burdens, and would quickly become unacceptably
intrusive.
Another alternative would be to incorporate information about wealth explic-
itly into Package Two's design so that the tax advantages (but not the other
features) would be phased out as accumulated wealth increases. For example,
when a certain threshold of wealth is reached (which would vary based on
age),28 4 the tax schedules for the two packages would become identical. How-
ever, people opting for Package Two would still be able to receive the in-kind
benefits of borrowing and spending restrictions and forward-skewed intraper-
sonal redistribution. In effect, this approach would involve "tagging" people
who opt for Package Two depending on their wealth accumulation levels2 85 and
then customizing the treatment that they receive based on that information.
Wealth might seem like an unpromising basis for tagging, given that it is
mutable. But complete immutability is not required for tagging to produce
283. On the other hand, the low tax rate might attract some people who lack knowledge of their own
self-control problems and thereby provide the benefits of precommitment to those who would otherwise
not seek them out. See supra text accompanying notes 253-54.
284. There is evidence that self-control problems fall with age. See Ameriks et al., supra note 25, at
970. But wealth accumulations at older ages would continue to reflect the effects of willpower
exercised (or not) at earlier ages. The idea that capital taxation might be varied by age is raised in James
Banks & Peter A. Diamond, The Base for Direct Taxation 59 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Dep't of Econ.,
Working Paper No. 08-11, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1112821.
285. See generally Akerlof, supra note 259 (developing the concept of "tagging," in which certain
characteristics are used to identify groups of taxpayers for particular tax or policy treatments).
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gains,2 86 and, as discussed below, some of the program details contemplated
here would make strategizing difficult. It is also perhaps notable that wealth is
already used as a tag of sorts when asset thresholds are employed as criteria for
certain social welfare programs.28 7
The rationale for building in information about wealth could rest in part on an
assumed correlation between wealth levels and willpower levels, holding in-
come and life stage constant.288 But we might also think that willpower lapses
are more damaging for those with less available wealth as a buffer. Thus, even if
a person's asset classification offers- only a weak signal of willpower, that
information may still provide a sensible basis for withdrawing the benefits of a
lighter tax schedule-the only piece of Package Two's treatment that operates at
cross-purposes with the packages' separation function.289
Of course, introducing a wealth criterion presents a new worry-that high-
and low-willpower people alike might shun savings in order to qualify for lower
tax rates. Introducing thresholds or breakpoints between net worth classes
presents additional concerns-that people will have a strong incentive to alter
their wealth accumulation behavior to stay in the more lightly taxed group, and
that people who differ only slightly in their holdings but lie on opposite sides of
the dividing line will be unfairly and arbitrarily subjected to different tax
treatment. These latter concerns could be ameliorated somewhat by adding a
"phase-out" range to soften the cliff effect, as well as by resetting the break-
points regularly based on criteria that are undisclosed in advance and produced
through some element of randomization.29 0
The broader concern that people will shun savings could be addressed in
some measure by the binding limits on borrowing and spending that come with
Package Two. Given those limits, people choosing Package Two cannot consis-
tently enjoy high earnings without also accumulating wealth that, over time,
will move them into higher asset brackets. Choosing Package Two, then, means
voluntarily ceding some control over the means through which one might
286. See id. at 15-16 (discussing and modeling cases of endogenous group membership--situations
where "people, by some effort or with some loss of utility, may alter their characteristics, thereby
becoming members of a tagged group"); see also Kyle Logue & Joel Slemrod, Genes as Tags: The Tax
Implications of Widely Available Genetic Information, 61 NA'L TAX J. 843, 849 (2008).
287. See, e.g., Robin Boadway et al., Agency and the Design of Welfare Systems, 73 J. Pus. EcoN. 1,
2 (1999) (listing "asset wealth" among the "personal characteristics" used to determine eligibility, and
connecting the eligibility determination process to Akerlof's idea of "tagging"); David A. Weisbach &
Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 999-1000, 1008-10
(2004) (discussing asset limits in the food stamp program).
288. See supra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 261-64 (on targeting versus separating).
290. Cf Jonathan Remy Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to Environmental
Grandfathering, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809, 815-28 (2009) (advocating "retrospective allocation" mecha-
nisms that introduce uncertainty into grandfathering schemes in an effort to reduce strategic behavior).
For further analysis of how the use of categorical information (tagging) might be combined with
income where there is heterogeneity among those within categories, see Ritva Immonen et al., Tagging
and Taxing: The Optimal Use of Categorical and Income Information in Designing Tax/Transfer
Schemes, 65 EcONOMICA 179 (1998).
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ordinarily attempt to game the system. Of course, people would continue to
have control over their earnings, and they could certainly reduce their wealth
indirectly (and thus qualify for lower rates) by reducing their earnings. But any
tax on labor earnings could be expected to disincentivize labor, even if wealth
were not made part of the picture.
The overall program could be designed to build in some additional protec-
tions against strategic behavior. For example, we might tinker with the revocabil-
ity of the choice among packages. If the choice were made irrevocable (for a
time), or if changes required incurring costs, then a high-willpower person
might not find it worthwhile to sneak into the Package Two ranks. Even if her
wealth level is presently low enough to deliver her a tax break, she will
eventually end up paying tax rates that are just as high as under Package One as
her wealth accumulates, but she will still be stuck with the annoying borrowing
and spending limits and intrapersonal redistribution that runs in the wrong
direction. It is still possible that a high-willpower person would gain enough in
tax breaks during low-earning years to make this gambit worthwhile, but the
extra liquidity that she can get through Package One's flexible tax repayment
terms may prove even more attractive. It would be unworkable to lock people
into their package choice for all time, but shorter limits and penalties for
shifting could keep people from finding it profitable to opportunistically "pack-
age surf."
Would all this design effort be worthwhile? The answer is far from clear.
Enabling both high-willpower and low-willpower people to better approximate
their OACPs seems quite attractive, as does the potential to reduce exercise
costs and failure costs simultaneously, while directing resources to those who
are the most willpower challenged. It is also possible that treating willpower
more selectively and surgically could forestall more socially costly initiatives
that would block certain consumption choices for high-willpower types as well
as low-willpower types. But there are many other considerations that would
bear on the feasibility and desirability of such an alternative, including adminis-
trative costs291 and concerns about unwarranted governmental leverage over
personal decisions.2 9 2 Moreover, there could be unwanted effects on the inculca-
291. See Field, supra note 256, at 22-30 (discussing the added burdens of complexity and administra-
tion that may be associated with tax provisions that allow for explicit elections).
292. For example, we might worry that low-income people would feel pressured by lower tax rates
into letting the government take over their personal financial choices. The extension of flexible
repayment terms and early life-cycle liquidity to the Package One taxpayers would help to counter that
concern. In addition, both of the tax schedules would presumably have a zero bracket and would
interact with existing programs like Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) and the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) in ways that would keep low-income people from being forced into a
desperate bargain with the government. But this merely shifts our concern up the income scale: perhaps
middle-class people would find Package Two's lower rates irresistible. There is, in fact, no way to
structure an incentive without having it attract some people who would not otherwise choose that
alternative. Hence, we must ultimately decide whether greater governmental control over personal
saving and spending decisions seems legitimate.
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tion of willpower and related values throughout society (erosion costs), if we let
people opt out of controlling important aspects of their own consumption paths.
The interaction of this approach with other measures designed to address
externalities would also require attention.
My point in sketching this example is not to advocate it, nor even to provide
a comprehensive review of its merits, but rather to provide a starting point for
thinking about how willpower differences might be addressed through policy.
Governmental decisions already implicate willpower, as we have seen, and it is
entirely possible that additional interventions will be in the offing. In consider-
ing these alternatives, we would do well to consider whether and how the
potential for self-selection could deliver benefits at lower cost. Indeed, one
potential takeaway lesson is the difficulty in engineering strategy-proof mecha-
nisms for moving money between people of different willpower levels and the
comparatively greater traction that intrapersonal transfers and tools might pro-
vide.
CONCLUSION
Tax policy grapples with numerous dimensions of human heterogeneity.293
This paper has intentionally focused on just one narrow slice-variations in
willpower. My analysis has necessarily filtered out much that is important and
relevant to devising tax policy. But I hope to have added an accessible account
of how and why willpower heterogeneity matters to tax policy, a framework for
evaluating policy efforts, and some ideas about how self-selection might be
employed to advance the treatment of willpower heterogeneity. As modeling
and empirical work continues on cognitive features, including willpower, it will
become increasingly important to understand how these lessons map onto real
and proposed tax systems. Mechanisms that can induce populations to self-sort
into groups that share cognitive traits can make for less intrusive and more
tailored social policy. I hope that the ideas presented here will lead to further
work along these lines.
293. For a recent examination of some of the complexities that heterogeneity introduces, see Louis
Kaplow, Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Preferences, B.E. J. OF EcON. ANALYsis & Pol'Y (Sept. 12,
2008), available at http://www.bepress.com/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article= 1947&content= bejeap.
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